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The concept of citizenship can be said to be historically linked to rights associated with 
membership in a political community.  These include civil, political and social rights. 
However, in the context of cultural diversity, these rights are arguably insufficient for 
cultural minorities, who by virtue of their membership in a minority group are 
disadvantaged. Therefore, the challenge is how to remedy this disadvantage and secure 
equal citizenship for cultural minorities. This thesis considers the work of three 
contemporary theorists who have provided innovative responses to this challenge: Will 
Kymlicka, Bhikhu Parekh and Brian Barry. Kymlicka and Parekh are both multicultural 
theorists whose general aim is to protect the integrity of minority groups via the notion 
of group-differentiated rights. However, Kymlicka’s framework focuses on the 
promotion of individual autonomy, which is problematic in lieu of the fact that 
culturally diverse societies will contain groups that do not attach primacy to liberal 
principles. Parekh’s framework fares better because it focuses on the value of cultural 
diversity and recognises that in the context of genuine diversity, establishing fair terms 
of justice for different communities involves intercultural dialogue. However, Parekh’s 
framework is let down by an implicit association with liberal values and a vague 
conception of how intercultural dialogue should proceed during hard cases of 
disagreement. An alternative to the multiculturalist approach is the work of Brian Barry 
who dismisses the notion of group-differentiated rights altogether as he believes the 
universal conception of citizenship will suffice in accommodating minority groups. 
However, Barry’s framework misses the mark because he fails to understand the 
significance of culture to its adherents and moreover, his position is arguably closer to 
the multiculturalist position than he concedes. To secure equal citizenship for 
disadvantaged cultural minorities, this thesis argues that a contextual approach to 
intercultural dialogue constitutes the most plausible response to hard cases of 
disagreements between majority and minority communities, and, furthermore, it argues 
that a contextual approach to intercultural dialogue can give rise to a common set of 
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Chapter 1. Introduction: A brief history of citizenship 
Since the end of the Second World War (WW2) in 1945, it can be said that the cultural 
fabric of Britain has changed dramatically. Severe shortages in the labour force due to 
the devastating effects of WW2 saw Britain plug this gap by recruiting migrant workers 
from various parts of the world including northern Africa, the West Indies and southern 
Europe. It was this strategy that signalled the start of mass migration. The next fifty 
years following the end of the war saw mass migration arguably make a discernible 
difference to the British population in terms of the diversity of ethno-cultural groups.  
As a result, new debates have emerged and a core concern of politicians, activists and 
theorists is how modern democratic societies should cope with this diversity in terms of 
addressing the needs that minority groups have, tackling racial prejudices and 
discrimination, promoting racial equality, and creating a united and cohesive society 
where various minority groups can live in harmony with their majority neighbours.  
Generally speaking, debates have focused on whether minority groups should be 
granted special rights to help preserve their way of life and whether they should be 
exempt from existing legislation that conflicts with their practices and beliefs. One 
example is the compulsory wearing of the turban in Sikh culture, which can conflict 
with a school uniform policy that requires boys to wear a cap and a law requiring 
motorcyclists to wear a protective helmet. Another example is the halal and kosher 
method of animal slaughter and whether Muslim and Jewish communities should be 
exempt from existing animal slaughtering legislation. These issues have given rise to 
lively debates and a variety of responses and policy recommendations. For example, the 
Runnymede Trust established the Commission on the Future of Multi-Ethnic Britain to 
consider the challenges associated with cultural diversity and produced a controversial 
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report published in 2000 entitled The Future of Multi-Ethnic Britain, better known as 
The Parekh Report. Other notable government initiatives include two reports published 
by the Commission on Racial Equality (CRE) - Citizenship and Belonging: What is 
Britishness? (2005) and The Decline of Britishness: A Research Study (2006). 
However, despite long-standing debates and various policy initiatives, the position of 
minority groups in Britain remains contentious and the very notion of multicultural 
politics is highly contested.  
 In this context the question of how to secure equal citizenship for minority 
groups has been central to recent debates. While multicultural theorists such as Bhikhu 
Parekh and Will Kymlicka have argued in favour of a differentiated conception of 
citizenship, which grants members of minority community’s group-specific rights, 
critics of multicultural politics such as Brian Barry contend that such an approach 
cannot be reconciled with a liberal commitment to equality. This chapter seeks to 
explore the background to these debates by considering the general hallmarks of 
citizenship in liberal democracies. In this context, the chapter will explore the work of 
T.H Marshall, whose seminal book Citizenship and Social Class (1950) explores the 
civil, political and social facets of citizenship in modern liberal democracies. The 
chapter will argue that Marshall’s discussion of the social barriers to equal citizenship 
can be seen as a precursor to recent debates regarding the status of cultural minorities. 
First though, the next section of this chapter will look at the link between democracy, 
liberalism and citizenship. Historical trajectories suggest that citizenship is intimately 
linked to membership in a political community, thus suggesting an affiliation with 
democracy and liberal values. However, there is also arguably a range of prima facie 
tensions between democracy and liberalism. Debates regarding social and cultural 
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rights can be seen as attempts to resolve some of these tensions and thus secure equal 
standing and effective democratic participation for all citizens.  
Democracy, liberalism and citizenship 
Historically, citizenship has been linked to rights associated with membership in a 
political community, one in which those who enjoy a certain status are entitled to 
participate on an equal basis with their fellow citizens in making collective decisions 
that govern society. What makes the citizen distinct is that he joins with others to make 
decisions and then subsequently respects the authority of these mutually established 
decisions (Pattie et al: 2004: 5).  Essentially, this concept of citizenship is linked to 
political participation in some form of democracy. In contemporary modern-day 
societies, the benefits and privileges of “democratic citizenship” are essentially the 
minimum that members should expect considering they live and participate in one. 
Such benefits and privileges include the equal status as citizens and the right to equal 
standing before the law.  
In the context of this thesis, democracy itself denotes many intrinsic values 
which are synonymous with the values of citizenship and core liberal values. For 
example, democratic procedures embody the idea of autonomy by allowing citizens to 
collectively determine their own affairs. Citizens may possess their own moral 
principles, thus a political system that maximises the scope for citizens to decide their 
own laws and institutions would further enhance this autonomy. It also embodies the 
idea of equality by allowing each citizen a free and equal say in law-making. In 
addition, democracy secures the dignity and self-respect of all citizens by 
acknowledging their equal status through political participation. However, while the 
values and virtues inherent in a democratic citizenship are in many regards mutually 
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supportive, there are arguably also some significant prima facie tensions between the 
two concepts. Three long-standing worries, already captured by de Tocqueville in his 
influential book Democracy in America, continue to be significant: (1) worries 
regarding the “tyranny of the majority”; (2) tensions between the liberal regard for 
individualism and the democratic concerns with the common good; and (3) potential 
conflicts between the liberal respect for the freedom of individuals to form sectional 
associations and the democratic concern for a unified and cohesive citizenry. 
As de Tocqueville already noted, when he referred to the dangers inherent in the 
“tyranny of the majority”, the democratic commitment to majority rule carries with it 
the risk of restricting the freedom of the minority should a minority find itself 
consistently outvoted. In a contemporary context this has given rise to concerns that in 
modern pluralist democracies, a commitment to simple majority rule may give rise to 
rules and regulations that favour the cultural traditions of the majority at the expense of 
the needs of minority cultural groups. Such marginalisation may not only leave 
minority groups with a lack of resources, but may also lead to a decrease in the political 
participation by members of minority cultural groups. As Yash Ghai (2003: 5) points 
out, minority groups all too often become alienated from the mainstream political 
process because they believe they cannot influence outcomes due to their status as 
minorities. For example, while minorities may have the right to participate in the 
political process, whether by running for office or voting in elections, their capacity to 
exercise that right is often restricted by the dominance of the majority. As a result, 
minorities may feel less inclined to participate. 
In addition, de Tocqueville feared that the spread of individualism in modern 
liberal-democratic societies would lead to an erosion of social bonds and civic virtue. 
He claims that individualism is a “mature and calm feeling, which disposes each 
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member of the community to sever himself from the mass of his creatures and to draw 
apart with his family and friends...” (de Tocqueville: 1998: 205). In other words, 
individualism promotes selfishness and is a threat to society because it encourages 
people to believe in their own sense of self-worth, to view themselves as self-sufficient 
and to neglect their public duties. De Tocqueville (1998: 206) feared that the conditions 
of individualism would create more people who have gained or earned enough to keep 
on sustaining themselves without taking any interest in their neighbours, therefore 
resulting in people losing their sense of connection with society.  While de Tocqueville 
is correct to highlight the danger of excessive individualism, individuals must arguably 
enjoy a degree of freedom to pursue their own interests without being subjected to 
discrimination and prejudice. If individuals are prevented from pursuing their interests 
because of social sanctions or the imposition of excessive social costs, they are arguably 
disadvantaged. This can take several forms. Being forced to conform to the interests of 
and views of the majority not only undermines the individual’s ability to freely shape 
their own life, but also undermines their sense of individual identity. A person’s 
individual identity is important as it can be tied up with membership in a cultural or 
religious community and the distinctive values and practices associated with it. If a 
significant aspect of the person’s culture is undermined, that person’s sense of identity 
may also be threatened. Furthermore, when citizens are in principle free to pursue their 
own interests, they may none the less be constrained by a lack of resources to, for 
example, build a suitable place of worship within their neighbourhood. Other 
disadvantages also stem from the impact of the dominant norms within society that 
reflect majority interests. For example, public holidays in the UK such as Christmas and 
Easter are recognised and celebrated nationwide thus reflecting the majority preferences 
while other cultural celebrations such as Eid and Rosh Hashanah are not. In the context 
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of contemporary debates regarding cultural diversity and multicultural politics, these 
concerns have given rise to a lively debate on how to balance the need for social 
cohesion and civic virtue with the right of minority communities to pursue their own 
distinctive way of life. 
This point also serves to highlight potential conflicts between the liberal respect 
for the freedom of individuals to form sectional associations and the democratic 
concern for a unified and cohesive citizenry. While de Tocqueville reminds us that 
sectional associations can play a vital role in safeguarding individuals from the “tyranny 
of the majority” by giving a voice to minority concerns, sectional associations also 
carry with them the risk of undermining citizens’ commitment to the common good of 
the polity as a whole as citizens promote the interests, values and concerns of their 
particular group at the expense of the well-being of the wider political community.  
While in the context of contemporary debates some theorists have defended 
group-differentiated rights for cultural minorities as an aspect of the liberal commitment 
to freedom of association, critics of multicultural politics such as Barry have 
highlighted the risks to unity and social cohesion associated with a desire to respect and 
recognise the distinct traditions of minority communities, by granting these 
communities group-differentiated rights designed to maintain and safeguard the cultural 
values and traditions of minority groups.  
The social dimension of citizenship 
The above section has highlighted several tensions regarding the civil and political 
aspect of citizenship. The first is the inherent dangers of a democratic citizenship where 
majority interests take precedence over minority interests. The second is the contentious 
nature of individualism. Although excessive individualism can be detrimental to social 
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unity, individuals must enjoy a degree of freedom to pursue their interests, especially if 
it is tied up with their identity or membership of a cultural or religious community. 
Furthermore, it also highlights the difficulties in achieving a balance between the well-
being and cohesiveness of the wider society and the well-being of minority groups. 
Another set of considerations significant to any discussion of minorities and 
citizenship is the “social dimension” of citizenship. Here, T.H. Marshall’s influential 
essay Citizenship and Social Class constitutes a useful starting point. Published in 1950 
(though all references here refer to the 1992 edition), Marshall articulated the concept 
of citizenship as a “three-legged stool” comprising of civil, political and social rights. 
According to Marshall, civil rights emerged first in the eighteenth century followed by 
political rights in the nineteenth century. The civil component consists of rights 
necessary for individual freedom including freedom of speech, the right to own 
property, the right to justice and all necessary rights governed by the courts of justice 
(1992: 8). The political element of citizenship is comprised of the right to participate in 
the exercise of political power as a member of a body invested with political power or 
as elector of the members of such a body. The institutions responsible here are 
parliament, local councils and government (1992: 8).  The concept of social rights 
emerged in the twentieth century. For Marshall, these rights can help facilitate the 
effective exercise of civil and political rights. The social element of citizenship for 
Marshall includes the right to economic welfare and security, health care, education and 
the institutions relating to this, namely educational systems and social services (1992: 
8).  
Marshall’s concern at the time of writing was the exclusion of the working class 
from the dominant culture due to the negative impact of capitalist market forces. Since 
their exclusion was based on their social status, he attempts to show how social rights 
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can alleviate the inequalities of social class through the redistribution of material 
resources and also how it provides the basis for shared identities and social unity 
through a common membership (Kymlicka: 1995: 179-180). Marshall defines social 
rights as “...the whole range from the right to a modicum of economic welfare and 
security to the right to share to the full in the social heritage and to live the life of a 
civilised being according to the standards prevailing in the society” (1992: 8). He 
believes all citizens should be entitled to a basic minimum standard of living which 
includes income, educational opportunities and healthcare. He analysed, for example, 
how free health care can promote a minimum standard of living, in the sense that those 
who cannot afford health care can still access it, while those who can afford it are free 
to spend their money on other things (1992: 33). However, it must be noted that 
although Marshall’s primary concern is the exclusion of the working class, his aim was 
not to achieve equality of income. For Marshall basic minimum state services give rise 
to a: 
 ...general enrichment of the concrete substance of civilised life, a general 
reduction of risk and insecurity, an equalisation between the more and the less 
fortunate at all levels - between the healthy and the sick, the employed and the 
unemployed, the old and the active, the bachelor and the father of a large family. 
(1992: 33) 
 
Essentially, he believes that the development of social rights will remove 
disadvantages that may prevent or restrict citizens from taking full advantage of their 
civil and political rights. For Marshall, social rights constitute the “third leg” in the 
“three-legged stool” of citizenship and without the “third leg”, it would be difficult to 
prop up the “first” and “second” leg (civil and political rights respectively).  
In terms of citizenship, Marshall’s analysis remains important because he brings 
clarity to an ambiguous concept. It establishes a clear criterion as to what full 
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citizenship requires – civil, political and social rights. In addition, although it has not 
been completely eradicated, there is evidence to suggest that social rights, to an extent, 
have narrowed the gap in terms of inequalities (Kymlicka: 1995: 180). It is also 
important because the aim of this thesis is similar to Marshall’s, which is to ensure that 
all citizens are treated as a full and equal member of society. Marshall’s focus was on 
the politics of redistribution when he devised the concept of social rights as a response 
to the exclusion of the white working-class population from the national culture. The 
politics of redistribution arguably continue to play an important role in contemporary 
debates. Where ethnic and cultural divisions overlap with class divisions, individuals 
may well face a double disadvantage on account of both class and cultural status. For 
example, a 2002 survey found that Muslims from Pakistani and Bangladeshi groups 
were two-and-a-half times more likely to be unemployed and three times more likely to 
be on a lower salary than their white counterparts (Peele: 2006).   
In contrast, there are suggestions that Marshall’s framework lacks relevance in 
modern-day society. Generally speaking, his model ignores the distinct peoples 
(Scottish, Welsh and Northern Irish) that make up the United Kingdom, instead 
focusing on the English (Turner: 2009: 69). In the context of contemporary citizenship, 
his framework shows no awareness of ethnic and racial problems in relation to 
citizenship as it is more or less based on a homogenous society in which cultural and 
ethnic divisions play no part in his analysis (Turner: 2009: 69). As a result, his 
framework is inadequate for the needs of minority groups as differences based on their 
cultural identity are now becoming common and therefore it limits their ability to 
exercise their citizenship rights as defined by Marshall. While Marshall views social 
rights as a means of eliminating the problems of social class, ethnic and racial 
minorities do not see their differences as a “problem” to be eliminated so that they can 
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become just like the majority. They typically see their differences as something that 
they wish to cherish, to be recognised by the majority; furthermore, they see their 
differences as something that can be complementary to their roles as citizens, not 
barriers. This arguably impacts on the manner in which minorities experience their civil 
and political rights. For example, civil rights are a key component in the protection of 
individual freedom from government, private parties, employers and citizens alike. A 
Rastafarian utilising his freedom to follow the Rastafarian culture would have his civil 
rights infringed if he was rejected for a job because a company insisted its employees 
had short neat hair even though the wearing of dreadlocks, a key component of 
Rastafarian culture, has no bearing on whether or not they can adequately perform the 
job. Question marks over whether individuals from minority groups experience full 
political rights also come into the equation here. Using an earlier example, Ghai (2003) 
believes minority groups all too often become isolated from the mainstream political 
process because they are of the view that due to their status as minorities, it will be 
impossible to influence the outcome. On the surface, there is an element of truth in that 
view, but in order to counter it, the voice of minority groups must be heard loud and 
clear so that they can articulate their concerns and aim to seek their desired outcomes 
through the necessary political channels. This is vital in the interests of justice when it 
can be said that the state accounting for the rights of its citizens must take into 
consideration minority groups and not just the majority. Sustained engagement in 
participation can effectively prevent a sense of alienation among minority groups thus 
creating a sense of belonging to the state. 
While de Tocqueville’s analysis of a democratic citizenship highlights concerns 
regarding political equality, Marshall’s analysis highlights the link between social status 
and civil and political rights. He identified that England was divided in terms of social 
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class and the lack of material resources made it difficult for the working class to 
participate in the dominant culture. Lack of material resources made it difficult for civil 
and political rights to be properly utilised and he proposed the development of social 
rights such as health care, education and welfare benefits to narrow this inequality. By 
narrowing the inequality gap, the working class would be able to participate on an equal 
footing and integrate into the dominant culture and hence generate a sense of loyalty 
and solidarity (Kymlicka: 1995: 180). However, because Marshall’s analysis was made 
in a particular context, that of working-class England, it is bound to have limited 
applicability in contemporary debates.  
Post-war migration has drastically altered the cultural homogeneity of Britain to 
one that is more ethnically and racially diverse and this in itself raises questions that 
Marshall’s framework cannot answer. Social rights do not answer concerns relating to 
cultural and religious matters such as, animal slaughter and the wearing of the turban 
and niqab. These matters are of great significance to cultural minorities and since social 
rights such as health care, education and economic welfare do not meet the integration 
and cultural needs of minority groups, it suggests that Marshall’s concept of citizenship 
ought to be expanded from the “three-legged stool” to a “four-legged chair” via the 
development of a range of minority rights. 
Outline of the thesis 
Part I of this thesis will draw on the work of Kymlicka (Chapter 2), Parekh (Chapter 3) 
and Barry (Chapter 4) to explore the notion of minority rights. Chapter 2 begins by 
highlighting Will Kymlicka’s core thesis: minority rights help to secure the individuals’ 
ability to live autonomous lives and expand their range of options in terms of living the 
good life. In other words, minority rights foster liberal principles such as individual 
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freedom and autonomy. Chapter 2 argues that because Kymlicka views culture 
primarily in instrumental terms, he fails to take into account other worthy reasons to 
cherish cultures. The thesis argues that an alternative framework is required to capture 
these factors. To this end, Chapter 3 explores Bhikhu Parekh’s notion of the intrinsic 
worth of cultural diversity as a collective good. He believes that since individuals are 
culturally embedded, daily interaction and exposure to the beliefs and practices of 
different cultures is essential to expand our intellectual horizons and also to deepen our 
understanding of our own culture. To co-exist peacefully and achieve a balance 
between diversity and unity, it would be mutually beneficial to engage in dialogue to 
establish just and fair terms for the relationship between different cultural communities. 
Although Parekh’s framework offers key insights, Chapter 3 will contend that his 
framework remains problematic on three counts: (a) his concept of intercultural 
dialogue remains vague; (b) despite arguing that his framework transcends liberal 
boundaries, the political structure he advocates remains rooted in a liberal trajectory; 
and (c) his conception of a national identity grounded in politico-institutional 
characteristics reflects the liberal tendency to draw an unduly sharp distinction between 
the public and private realms of society. Chapter 4 explores a radical alternative to the 
works discussed in Chapters 2 and 3 by looking at the work of Brian Barry. As a 
staunch egalitarian liberal, Barry opposes group-differentiated rights that are based on 
an attachment to culture or religion. He believes that members of cultural communities 
do not need to be protected by such rights, and that the rights associated with a unitary 
conception of citizenship will suffice to accommodate minority claims. However, 
Chapter 4 will argue that ultimately Barry misses the point in his critique of 
multiculturalism because he fails to understand the significance of culture to its 
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adherents. Moreover, it will argue that despite his disdain for multicultural policies, his 
own position is actually closer to the multiculturalist position than he concedes. 
Part II proffers an alternative framework that this thesis believes can 
accommodate the needs of a genuine multicultural society. It is centred on the belief 
that a contextual approach to intercultural dialogue constitutes the most plausible 
response to hard cases of disagreements between majority and minority communities. 
While Parekh’s conception of dialogue is too vague, it nonetheless implies a contextual 
approach to dialogue, and it is to this end that Chapter 5 seeks to develop the idea of 
intercultural dialogue within the context of debates in contemporary Britain.  
To achieve this, Chapter 5 examines the concept of “Britishness” via the use of 
sociological data produced by the Equality and Human Rights Commission, then known 
as the Commission for Racial Equality (CRE). Although the findings indicate a decline 
in the notion of “Britishness”, the data also highlights factors shared by the participants. 
This thesis believes this is indicative of the bigger picture in that there are overarching 
factors that bind the people of Britain together. Chapter 5 will outline how intercultural 
dialogue can nurture these overarching factors into an overarching British identity that 
can sustain unity yet is sufficiently flexible to accommodate diversity. The idea is that a 
clear and comprehensive framework of values and commitments will emerge during the 
dialogical process, and what makes this framework unique is that it is derived by the 
citizenry itself which will command further legitimacy. Furthermore, these values and 
commitments can then serve as the backdrop to a contextual approach to hard cases of 
disagreements between majority and minority communities. It will conclude by arguing 
that this conception of dialogue can give rise to a framework of values that is thicker 
than the framework advocated by Parekh and hence stands a better chance of sustaining 
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unity within a genuinely multicultural society. The final chapter reiterates the need for a 




Chapter 2. Kymlicka’s multicultural citizenship 
In the quest for disadvantaged groups to be treated equally, it can be said that following 
on from civil and political rights, Marshall perceived the development of social rights as 
constituting the “third leg” in the “three-legged stool” of citizenship rights. Marshall’s 
concern was for the working-class population as they were excluded from the dominant 
culture due to the negative impact of capitalist market forces. In effect, they were 
excluded because of their social status and the development of social rights was to help 
them participate in the dominant society. In the face of cultural diversity, it can be 
argued that group-differentiated rights constitute a natural follow-on from social rights 
and that these rights constitute the “fourth leg” thus creating the “four-legged chair” of 
citizenship. In the context of this thesis, group-differentiated rights usually refer to 
rights that seek to protect cultural communities and ethnic and religious groups. How or 
whether the concept of group rights is justified has given rise to considerable debates. 
One important and influential debate is rooted in the work of Will Kymlicka, whose 
work is renowned for attempting to develop a liberal theory of group-differentiated 
rights. He believes the justification for group-differentiated rights can be found in an 
appeal to liberal commitments to equality and autonomy. This chapter will argue that 
this justification gives rise to merely an instrumental defence of group-differentiated 
rights, which ultimately fails to capture the value many cultural minorities attach to 
cultural membership. In particular, it will highlight three major concerns regarding 
Kymlicka’s liberal framework: (a) worries regarding Kymlicka’s sharp distinction 
between national and ethnic minority groups and their rights; (b) concerns regarding his 
emphasis on the promotion of individual autonomy; and (c) his failure to appreciate 
cultural diversity on its own terms. The chapter concludes by arguing that Kymlicka’s 
instrumental framework should be rejected in favour of a framework that endorses the 
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intrinsic worth of cultural diversity, a framework supported in the work of Bhikhu 
Parekh.  
I: Kymlicka’s position  
Traditionally, it could be said that the concept of group-differentiated rights is 
incompatible with the liberal commitment to autonomy and equality. However, 
Kymlicka disagrees and believes that the justification of group-differentiated rights can 
be grounded in liberal principles such as autonomy and equality. For Kymlicka, 
autonomy and cultural membership are inextricably linked. For individuals to be 
autonomous, firstly they must be able to lead their life from the inside in accordance 
with their beliefs about what constitutes the good life and secondly, since individuals 
are fallible, they must be able to question and revise their beliefs in light of new 
experiences and circumstances and hence must have the necessary conditions to acquire 
knowledge of the different conceptions of the good life (Kymlicka: 1995: 81). 
Kymlicka contends that the exercise of these conditions is only possible within a secure 
cultural context that promotes autonomy (Kymlicka: 1995: 80, 85).  
The secure cultural context in question is what Kymlicka terms a “societal 
culture”. According to Kymlicka (2001: 25), most nation states, including liberal 
democracies, have surfaced as a result of deliberate and sustained processes of nation-
building with a focus on promoting a “societal culture”. A societal culture “…provides 
meaningful ways of life across the full range of human activities, including social, 
educational, religious, recreational and economic life” (Kymlicka: 1995: 76). In 
addition, such societal cultures are territorially concentrated, based on a shared 
language and are institutionally embodied in schools, media, the economy and the 
government (Kymlicka: 1995: 76). In this context, cultural membership is inextricably 
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tied up with autonomy in that, a societal culture provides individuals with various and 
valuable options which allow them to make rational and meaningful decisions. It is a 
societal culture that provides the social environment from which individuals can make 
choices and pursue their beliefs about the good life. Given its importance for the 
exercise of choice and freedom, having access to a secure societal culture is imperative 
because not only does it provide the range of options, but it also makes these options 
meaningful (Kymlicka: 1995: 82-83). This means that the social practices we choose to 
pursue are based on our beliefs about the value and meaning of these practices. 
According to Triadafilopoulos (1997: 269), to have a belief about one’s practice is in 
turn a matter of understanding the meanings attached to it by his or her culture, and 
understanding the meanings requires an understanding of the shared language. 
However, because the nation state effectively cultivates a dominant societal 
culture, comprised of a common language and shared institutions, Kymlicka believes it 
will inevitably create benefits and burdens, benefitting those who share the dominant 
culture and burdening those who do not. Those benefitting will be the majority 
population as they effectively receive the “goods” associated with a societal culture for 
free. Those being burdened will be minority communities whose practices and beliefs 
are significantly different from the dominant societal culture and who effectively have 
to spend their own resources to maintain aspects of their own societal culture. In this 
context, without a secure societal culture, cultural minorities may be disadvantaged 
because the context in which they understood and pursued their meaningful options no 
longer exists. In other words, a lack of a secure societal culture can undermine the 
ability to pursue an autonomous life. For example, since English is the official language 
used in, say, British schools and other public services, it would disadvantage newly-
arrived immigrants who have a different mother tongue. To adapt, they are expected to 
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integrate into the dominant societal culture which involves learning English, and this, 
according to Kymlicka (1995: 85), can be a costly and arduous process that can occur 
across generations. For example, it can depend on the age of the person and the 
gradualness of the integration process (Kymlicka: 1995: 85). If immigrants wish to keep 
their minority language alive because it is an important feature for their community, 
they will need to spend their own resources, for example, funding weekend or evening 
schools, while at the same time, the majority receive their linguistic heritage for free. In 
these circumstances, group-differentiated rights are regarded as measures to remedy 
such an unfair disadvantage (Kymlicka: 1995: 113).  
Kymlicka argues that because liberals support measures mitigating the effects of 
unequal outcomes which arise through no fault of the individual, they ought to support 
group-differentiated rights for minorities in the same circumstances (Kymlicka: 1989: 
186). For example, individuals born into poverty or with a physical disability are 
arguably disadvantaged when it comes to living a fulfilling life. Therefore, they should 
be given resources that can afford them a fulfilling life because they did not choose to 
be born into poverty, nor did they choose to be born with a disability (Kymlicka: 1989: 
186). Using the same principle, since minority communities often find themselves at a 
disadvantage in terms of preserving the integrity of their societal culture, they should be 
compensated because it is through no fault of their own that the dominant societal 
culture promotes the interests and needs of those other than their own. Group-
differentiated rights can be regarded as the measure for addressing these disadvantages 
as not only do such rights promote fairness between minority and majority 
communities, but they also ensure measures are in place for autonomy to thrive. From 
this perspective, if liberals are committed to the promotion of autonomy and equality, 
they should also endorse group-differentiated rights for minority communities.  
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Kymlicka also distinguishes between the types of claims minority communities 
may make. In general, minorities may make a claim for internal restrictions and 
external protections. The former generally refers to the group seeking the use of state 
power to limit the freedom and liberties of its members in the name of solidarity 
(Kymlicka: 1995: 36). However, restricting the freedom of individuals is inconsistent 
with any system of group rights that endorses individual autonomy (Kymlicka: 1995: 
153) and groups cannot reasonably expect their claims to be accommodated if their 
practices are in violation of this principle. Conversely, external protections refer to the 
group seeking to protect itself from the decisions of the larger society (Kymlicka: 1995: 
35-36). Because a liberal view requires equality between minority and majority groups, 
external protections should be endorsed because such measures promote fairness 
between groups by putting minority cultures on a level standing with the dominant 
majority culture (Kymlicka: 1995: 37). 
For Kymlicka then, secure membership of a cultural community is key to 
promoting autonomy. However, Kymlicka believes the right to membership of a 
cultural community does not belong to all minority groups equally. This is due to the 
distinction he makes between national and ethnic groups, with the former accorded 
more rights than the latter. For Kymlicka, national groups are historical communities 
that occupy a given territory or homeland, share a distinct language and culture and 
despite their involuntary incorporation into the larger polity, retain a sense of 
nationhood that distinguishes them from the majority culture (Kymlicka: 1995: 10-11). 
With their own language and distinctive culture, national minorities may struggle to 
survive given the pressures towards the creation of a single common culture and, 
consequently, they will in all probability be marginalised from major political and 
social institutions (Kymlicka: 1995: 80). As a result, minorities often demand various 
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forms of self-governing rights to run their own affairs. He gives the example of Quebec, 
a French-speaking province of Canada, which enjoys extensive devolved powers over 
issues that are significant to the survival of the French culture including education and 
language (Kymlicka: 1995: 28). Ethnic groups, in contrast, are groups who voluntarily 
leave their original homeland thus leaving behind the set of practices that made sense to 
them (Kymlicka: 1995: 78). They possess their own distinct cultural beliefs which they 
hope to preserve while wishing to be integrated into the larger society and be accepted 
as full and equal members in it. As Kymlicka (1995:11) puts it, “While they often seek 
greater recognition of their ethnic identity, their aim is not to become a separate and 
self-governing nation alongside the larger nation but to modify the institutions and laws 
of the mainstream society to make them more accommodating of cultural differences”. 
Moreover, ethnic groups tend to lack a fully developed societal culture. Kymlicka 
therefore believes it is necessary to accord ethnic groups the rights that help them to 
express and preserve parts of their cultural heritage while facilitating their integration 
into the wider society. Exemptions from laws that disadvantage minority groups and 
public funding of cultural practices including arts and festivals are examples of 
measures that can achieve this (Kymlicka: 1995: 31). 
II: Critique 
Kymlicka’s conception of citizenship certainly constitutes an innovative attempt to 
demonstrate that the notion of group-differentiated rights is compatible with liberal 
principles such as individual autonomy and equality. He rightly identifies that group-
differentiated rights can aid the process of integration rather than hinder it, and he also 
correctly identifies that while the traditional model of citizenship, which encourages a 
single culture and a common identity through the implementation of basic social rights, 
has been successful in terms of integrating the working-class population into the 
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national culture, it does not constitute a viable model for integrating ethnic and cultural 
minorities (Kymlicka: 2002: 328). Hence it is necessary for group-differentiated rights 
to be accorded to minority groups. Moreover, in addition to remedying the 
disadvantages minority groups may suffer, it could also be argued that group-
differentiated rights can help to cultivate a shared sense of belonging to the wider 
community. This is because denying minorities the right to exercise their beliefs is more 
likely to undermine social cohesion since it makes it less likely that minority groups 
will participate and interact with the dominant wider society. 
However, there are doubts as to whether Kymlicka’s conception of group-
differentiated rights and indeed his notion of multicultural citizenship can accommodate 
the needs of a genuinely multicultural society. Critics have identified three potentially 
significant worries regarding his defence of group-differentiated rights: (a) an unduly 
sharp distinction between national and ethnic minority groups and their respective 
rights; (b) an undue emphasis on the promotion of individual autonomy; and (c) a 
failure to appreciate cultural diversity on its own terms.  The rest of this chapter will 
explore and highlight these concerns. 
a) Distinction between self-governing and polyethnic rights 
Recall the distinction Kymlicka draws between national minorities and ethnic groups 
and the subsequent rights accorded, self-governing and polyethnic rights. National 
minorities are historical communities with a distinct culture and language who were 
typically incorporated into the state involuntarily. Hence Kymlicka believes they should 
be accorded self-governing rights that deal with specific issues relating to the national 
minority, such as education and language issues. In contrast, ethnic groups tend to be 
immigrant groups who voluntarily leave their homeland to join a new society. They 
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typically wish to preserve aspects of their cultural practices while wishing to integrate 
into the wider society. Consequently, Kymlicka believes polyethnic rights are intended 
to help ethnic groups express their cultural heritage without restricting their efforts to 
participate and compete in the dominant wider society. 
 The first issue to note is that the distinction between national and ethnic 
minorities is too sharp, as is the distinction between self-governing and polyethnic 
rights (Carens: 1997: 35-47; Kukathas: 1997: 406-427; Mason: 2000: 125; Parekh: 
2006: 103; Young: 1997: 48-57). Making such a sharp distinction is problematic in 
several respects. The first is that it cannot accommodate all cultural minorities as 
acknowledged by Kymlicka himself. For example, he argues that African Americans do 
not fall into the ethnic group category because they are descendants of slaves brought 
involuntarily to a new land by force and they do not fall under the national minority 
category because they do not have a common language or territory (Kymlicka: 1995: 
24). Similarly, refugees do not fall under either category because they do not come to a 
new land voluntarily (Kymlicka: 1995: 25) and instead come because they are escaping 
war zones or persecution (Kukathas: 1997: 413). Other than refugees and African 
Americans, who he regards as a unique case, he fails to recognise that there may be 
other cases of groups that do not fall into either category. Kukathas identifies that the 
“involuntarily” aspect which Kymlicka ties to national minorities and the “voluntarily” 
aspect that he ties to ethnic groups is problematic. This is because the “involuntarily” 
aspect can also be applied to ethnic groups and the “voluntarily” aspect can be applied 
to national groups. For example, in terms of the “voluntarily” aspect, Kukathas notes 
that many Quebecois are in a position to live either as French-Canadians or Canadians 
but they voluntarily choose to hold on to their French heritage. In terms of the 
“involuntarily” aspect, Turkish immigrants in Germany can be regarded as involuntarily 
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members of their group because even though they wish to be regarded as members of 
the wider society (“German”), they are regarded as foreigners (Kukathas: 1997: 413). 
Therefore, national minorities and ethnic groups cannot be as easily distinguished as 
Kymlicka suggests, especially if voluntariness of membership in the community or 
wider society is the common benchmark (Kukathas: 1997: 414). 
Another consequence deriving from Kymlicka’s sharp distinction is that it 
indicates that he privileges the cultures of national groups over all other minority 
groups. Due to the nature of their struggles, he regards national minority groups as the 
more deserving of rights since he accords them a full set of rights that allows them to 
govern their own affairs, while groups such as ethnic minorities are accorded the fewest 
(Parekh: 1997: 62; 2006: 108). Kymlicka asserts that since ethnic minorities voluntarily 
leave their country of origin, they also forgo their right to their societal culture, whereas 
since national minorities tend to be communities that are involuntarily incorporated into 
the wider society, they should be allowed to maintain their societal culture. This is 
difficult to fathom given that Kymlicka also stresses the importance of culture and the 
role it plays in individual lives. Echoing a point Carens makes, if people’s societal 
cultures are so important, immigrant groups should be on a par with national minorities 
in that they should also be allowed to recreate their societal cultures (Carens: 2000: 55). 
Therefore, it is difficult to see why only national minority groups are granted the full set 
of rights.  
It could be said in Kymlicka’s defence that the aim was not to favour national 
minorities over immigrant groups, but instead to differentiate the types of claims based 
on their needs. Since national minorities such as the Quebecois tend to occupy a given 
territory, possess their own distinctive culture, language and relevant institutions, and 
are involuntarily incorporated into a larger society, Kymlicka believes they can 
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typically sustain a viable societal culture, whereas immigrant groups lack the 
institutional foundation to build a societal culture. In this context, it is fair for national 
minorities to engage in their own programme of nation-building, by cultivating their 
own societal cultures and as part of this process, they may legitimately demand self-
governing rights. On the other hand, because they lack the institutional foundation, and 
due to their status as voluntary migrants who typically wish to participate in the 
dominant society, immigrant groups can legitimately claim polyethnic rights as a way 
of securing better chances of integrating due to the cost and difficulties they may 
endure. However, this is questionable. As Parekh points out, immigrant groups may 
well be able to sustain a societal culture, given that sometimes they can occupy a given 
territory, and given the right resources, can develop the institutions necessary for a 
societal culture (Parekh: 1997: 62). Therefore, Kymlicka’s assertion that self-governing 
rights should be allocated to national minorities alone is misguided as immigrant groups 
also possess the necessary capabilities to recreate their societal culture.  
Moreover, Kymlicka’s defence of polyethnic rights for ethnic groups is in itself 
inadequate. This is because Kymlicka ends up undermining his own argument as he 
tries to emphasise the inability of the state to be culturally neutral and hence argues for 
polyethnic rights on the basis that it would be unfair not to grant these, believing that 
immigrant groups will be burdened by the dominant societal culture. At the same time, 
he insists that immigrant groups have voluntarily consented to join the societal culture 
of their new homeland, which is a confusing point because why should immigrant 
groups be granted rights to preserve their cultural heritage if they have consented to join 
a new societal culture (Carens: 2000: 57)? This shows that making a distinction is 
unnecessary and actually undermines Kymlicka’s intended argument, which is simply 
to differentiate the types of claims based on needs.  
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It could also be argued that the distinction between self-governing and 
polyethnic rights is too sharp and therefore fails to recognise that in some cases,  the 
former set of rights may be more appropriate for immigrant groups while the latter set 
of rights may be more appropriate for national minorities. Demands by aboriginal 
groups in Canada (a national minority) for self-governing rights to control public 
institutions with regard to the aboriginal people are arguably akin to demands by 
Muslims in western societies (an immigrant minority) to control faith schools (Carens: 
1997: 36). Regarding the latter, the language rights enjoyed by French-Canadians 
outside of Quebec, such as the right to use French in federal courts, fall under the 
category of rights Kymlicka identifies as polyethnic rights (Carens: 1997: 37). If 
polyethnic rights can be extended to national minorities and self-governing to 
immigrant groups, it shows that a clear-cut distinction cannot be easily made. 
Therefore, as Young puts it, it would be more appropriate “…to think of cultural 
minorities in a continuum, or perhaps in a set of continuaa” (Young: 1997: 50-51). She 
states that if we were to think of cultural minorities in a continuum, we can think of 
differences among cultural groups as a matter of scale and degree rather than simply the 
types of differences (Young: 1997: 51). For example, if cultural minorities were viewed 
in a continuum, the debate on whether particular cultural groups have a viable societal 
culture becomes a matter of degree, rather than the either/or distinction Kymlicka 
makes (Young: 1997: 51). In addition, whether a cultural community resides within a 
larger society due to the voluntary actions of its members is also a matter of degree, as 
is the degree to which they integrate into and separate from the larger society (Young: 
1997: 51). What Young is claiming is that Kymlicka’s distinction draws an unnecessary 
contrast between national and ethnic groups and as a result, certain groups are only 
entitled to certain rights. Young’s suggestion therefore is to “soften” the distinction 
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Kymlicka makes as justice for minorities entails considering specific issues at stake, 
which means taking into account the specific circumstances of the group in question, 
such as the history of the group and how it became a minority in the first place (Young: 
1997: 52).  
On the whole, Kymlicka’s sharp distinction between national and ethnic groups 
gives rise to several problems. One is that not all cultural minorities are capable of 
being accommodated as they do not fall under one of Kymlicka’s categories. The 
involuntarily/voluntarily distinction is particularly unhelpful given that some migrants 
are not voluntary migrants, such as African Americans. There is also no scope for 
national minorities to be accorded rights that are earmarked for ethnic groups and vice 
versa. This is problematic because there are potentially legitimate cases of such rights 
being demanded as identified by Kukathas. It also privileges the cultures of national 
minorities over all other minority groups. This is worrying and confusing considering 
the importance of cultural membership to individuals and the role it plays in their lives. 
Rather than distinguishing between groups and the subsequent rights that can be 
accorded, this thesis believes we should consider cultural communities from the 
perspective of Young in that we should view them in a continuum and assess each 
claim within its distinctive context.  
b) The undue emphasis on the promotion of individual autonomy 
A second major concern regarding Kymlicka’s framework is that it is too grounded in 
liberal values, in particular the promotion of individual autonomy. Defending group-
differentiated rights on the basis that they promote individual autonomy raises the 
concern of whether his framework is capable of meeting and appreciating the needs of a 
genuinely culturally diverse society. A genuinely culturally diverse society will take 
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into account the needs of all cultural communities irrespective of whether they adhere 
to liberal principles or not. Contemporary multicultural societies contain within them 
values and belief systems from all walks of life. Some of these values and belief 
systems may be liberal in nature and some may not. Some may hold certain principles 
in a higher regard than others. Therefore a framework governing such a society must 
take this into account. This thesis argues that Kymlicka’s autonomy-based framework 
does not meet this criterion, and that non-liberal minorities or minorities that fail to 
uphold the principle of autonomy will be further marginalised. This section aims to 
highlight that an autonomy-based approach is flawed because not all cultural 
communities attach the same value to autonomy as liberals do and, also, some cultural 
communities view their culture as a context of identity, as opposed to a context of 
choice. 
Recall briefly that it is a societal culture that promotes autonomy, which 
involves leading a life according to one’s own beliefs and convictions and also having 
the ability to revise and question those beliefs in light of new information. In addition, 
Kymlicka’s distinction between external protections and internal restrictions also lends 
weight to his belief that autonomy, rather than tolerance, is liberalism’s fundamental 
principle. To value culture solely because it can create an extended range of options is 
flawed because it overlooks the multitude of ways in which cultural minorities relate to 
their culture.  In simple terms, there is more to culture than fostering autonomy. First of 
all, not all individuals value their culture simply because it can provide them with 
meaningful options and the ability to revise these options. There are some cultural 
communities that view their beliefs as sacrosanct and do not see them as something that 
can be revised and questioned (Cassatella: 2006: 83-84). Such cultural communities 
tend to base their claim for group rights on such factors (Cassatella: 2006: 97). This 
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may apply to religious groups who prefer to live their lives according to their respective 
doctrines. For example, Muslims do not see their cultural beliefs as something that can 
be readily questioned or revised (Cassatella: 2006: 83). Moreover, communities such as 
Hindus and Orthodox Jews view their culture as something to be inherited and passed 
down to future generations out of loyalty to their ancestors, while other groups like the 
secular Jewish community see their cultural background as constituting part of their 
identity (Parekh: 1997: 59). These are just some of the various ways in which minorities 
view and relate to their culture. It is also apparent that these ways of relating to culture 
are different from Kymlicka’s overtly autonomy-based approach. 
Giving undue emphasis to the promotion of autonomy is problematic because it 
does not give due weight to the importance of individual identity. In actuality, an 
argument based on expanding the choice sets of individuals is not particularly relevant 
for a genuinely multicultural society given that there is more to culture than autonomy. 
Indeed, cultural minorities tend to base their demands on the fact that their culture 
serves as a “context of identity” regardless of the range of options it provides (Courtois: 
2008: 36).  This point is echoed by Parekh who believes that individuals are culturally 
embedded in the sense that their behaviour and values are deeply shaped by their 
membership of a cultural community (Parekh: 2006: 120; 155). For Parekh, culture is 
constitutive of an individual’s identity because it structures the personality of 
individuals: 
They learn to see the world in a particular way, to individuate and assign certain 
meanings and significance to human activities and relationships, and to conduct 
the latter according to certain norms. They also acquire particular habits of 
thought and feeling, traits of temperament, inhibitions, taboos, prejudices, and 
musical, culinary, sartorial, artistic and other tastes. They build up a body of 
sentiments and memories, acquire love of certain kinds of sounds, smells and 
sights, heroes, role models, bodily gestures, values, ideals, and ways of holding 
and carrying themselves. Since all these are often acquired unconsciously and in 
the course of living within a more or less integrated way of life, they strike deep 
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roots and become an inseparable part of their personality. (Parekh: 2006: 155-
156) 
 
In his critique of Kymlicka, Forst argues that it is not culture as a “context of 
choice” that is important, but rather culture as a “context of identity” in the sense of the 
“historically grown, particular meaning a culture can confer to individuals as a member 
of that group” (Forst: 1997: 66). Only if we view culture as a specific social 
environment in which individuals are raised and identities are formed can a persuasive 
case be made as to why national minority groups should be allowed the opportunity to 
recreate their societal culture (Courtois: 2008: 36). In contrast to Kymlicka’s autonomy-
based argument, there is no reason to believe that members of a minority require access 
to their own particular culture as any culture that fosters autonomy should suffice. 
Therefore, an argument based on culture as a “context of choice” is insufficient whereas 
the argument based on culture as a “context of identity” is more compelling given the 
significance and value individuals place on their culture. Moreover, an argument based 
on the “context of identity” can also espouse the intrinsic value of cultures and indeed 
cultural diversity as a whole. As Courtois (2008: 37) notes, only the intrinsic worth of 
culture can adequately explain the deep bond and attachment individuals may have to 
their culture. 
In essence, Kymlicka’s assertion that we need our own culture to exercise 
autonomy is misguided because it is possible to show that a culture can simply be a 
“…means among others…” to exercise autonomy (Courtois: 2008: 37). In this respect, 
to justify the protection of cultures as a “context of choice” is not necessary because 
individuals do not have to grow up in their own culture in order to exercise their 
capacity for autonomy as it could very well be exercised in a cosmopolitan society 
(Courtois: 2008: 37). 
30 
 
c) Failure to appreciate cultural diversity and non-liberal communities 
An undue emphasis on the promotion of individual autonomy is also problematic on the 
grounds that it fails to take the needs of non-liberal communities seriously. This gives 
rise to the worry that Kymlicka fails to appreciate cultural diversity on its own terms. 
According to Cassatella (2006: 83), Kymlicka, with his emphasis on the core liberal 
values of autonomy and equality, fails to recognise that a genuinely multicultural 
society requires a framework that can adjust itself to plural understandings of culture. A 
framework grounded in liberal principles, in particular individual autonomy, carries 
little relevance for groups who do not endorse such principles. Some groups may be 
liberal, part-liberal or non-liberal, and values that are shared may not be ascribed the 
same importance as in other cultures. However, Kymlicka does not recognise this in his 
framework and seems to dismiss the needs of non-liberal groups as evident in his 
response to how liberals should respond to non-liberal groups – we should seek to 
liberalise them (Kymlicka: 1995: 94).  
This response is flawed for several reasons. One is that there is an inference that 
Kymlicka does not value non-liberal communities because their cultures are not 
realistic options (Parekh: 2006: 165) in the sense that it would be difficult for outsiders 
to engage and participate in the culture. The Amish community is a perfect example 
because given that the character of the community is to avoid contact with outsiders, it 
would be difficult to engage and interact with them. With the Amish community 
isolating itself and thus difficult to interact with, it could be assumed that their culture is 
not a realistic option for non-members. Since connecting with the Amish culture is not a 
realistic prospect, Kymlicka’s defence implies that there is no reason to engage or 
cherish their community (Parekh: 2006: 165). To supplement Parekh’s argument, 
Kymlicka’s theory would give us no reason to appreciate the Maori culture from a 
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devout Catholic perspective because there is no realistic prospect of becoming a 
member. To expect non-liberal communities to liberalise themselves internally so that 
their culture can be regarded as a realistic option for others highlights Kymlicka’s 
failure to appreciate cultures in themselves. Moreover, it indicates that if non-liberal 
communities do not relate to their culture from a liberal perspective, it will be difficult 
to secure justice for these groups (Cassatella: 2006: 83).  
Perhaps the main retort to Kymlicka’s answer is the sincerity and genuineness in 
the liberalising process. In simple terms, if non-liberals are to liberalise, what is the 
motivation considering Kymlicka’s defence is largely based on core liberal values. 
Cassatella raises this issue and argues that two scenarios can occur. One is that non-
liberals can accept and endorse autonomy for “prudential” reasons (Cassatella: 2006: 
89). The problem with this is that if non-liberals were to endorse autonomy for 
“prudential” reasons, it would be difficult to imagine they were doing so sincerely and 
actually hold these beliefs from the inside as Kymlicka demands (Cassatella: 2006: 89). 
For example, a group whose language is a pivotal part of their culture may request 
special rights or assistance in passing on their language to future generations, such as 
funding for weekend schools. However, the group in question may be non-liberal in the 
sense that it assigns a particular standing to women that is considered to be lower than 
that of men. This may manifest itself in the group restricting women to life at home 
meaning they are unable to experience the opportunities that male members have, such 
as economic opportunities and higher education. However, if the group wishes to secure 
funding that will ensure the future of their language for future generations, according to 
Kymlicka’s suggestion, they must “liberalise” or the state should seek to liberalise 
them. Since the language is a pivotal part of their culture and the group believes it will 
help the community to thrive, the group agrees to undergo this “liberalisation” process 
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and therefore “lifts” the restrictions it had previously placed on its female members. As 
a result, the women are now allowed to work and attend university if they desire. Using 
Cassatella’s logic, the group only lifted the restrictions on its female members to secure 
a pivotal part of their societal culture. They did not do so because they sincerely believe 
women should have the opportunity to work and attend university. This may have a 
negative effect in that once women are working and are in further education, they may 
face discrimination from male members of the group for pursuing roles that are 
traditionally considered for men only, or they may face subtle pressure to retain their 
traditional roles within the group.  
The second scenario that Cassatella envisages sees non-liberals being 
“motivated” to accept autonomy via education and persuasion so that their beliefs do 
indeed come from the inside (Cassatella: 2006: 89). The problem with this is that it is 
difficult to envisage how non-liberal groups such as the Amish can be motivated to take 
part in a liberal education to value autonomy (Cassatella: 2006: 89). Cassatella argues 
that a liberal education can either be “gently imposed” or offered as an option. The 
former is challenging because it is not evident how autonomy can play a role in 
“starting” to motivate such groups to take part; the latter is problematic because since it 
is a choice, it remains exactly that – a choice – and it is therefore unlikely that a non-
liberal group would freely take the choice (Cassatella: 2006: 89). This shows that as 
well as autonomy being problematic from a philosophical perspective, it is also 
problematic from a practical perspective. Kymlicka freely assumes the liberalisation 
process to be simple and straightforward and does not consider the potential 
implications of such a process.  
From a philosophical perspective, Kymlicka’s strategy of liberalising non-
liberal groups is also problematic. This thesis believes such a strategy is incompatible 
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with genuine diversity as it involves profoundly changing the very qualities that make 
the group culturally distinct in the first place. Using the Amish as an example, it would 
mean members being given the opportunity to sample life outside their community. 
Sampling life outside the Amish community may involve new opportunities to do 
things they could never do before, such as using modern technology and dating people 
outside their community. Instead of using traditional methods such as a horse-drawn 
carriage, members are presented with the opportunity to drive a car, and instead of 
dating a fellow Amish they can date an African American. Such moves would be in 
accordance with the autonomy argument Kymlicka gives because a member is now 
presented with more “options”. Members sampling life outside their community now 
have an extended range of options in terms of what constitutes the good life and now 
have the capacity to form new beliefs and values about the good life. Such moves are 
consistent with the promotion of autonomy because a member can then decide what is 
best for him – driving an automobile or a horse-drawn carriage or dating a fellow 
Amish or dating someone who is non-Amish. Although consistent with the autonomy 
argument, such moves risk taking away the community’s distinct character. This is 
because the inherent “character” of the Amish community is essentially non-liberal if 
compared to core liberal values. The character of a group, according to Kymlicka, 
consists of the culture’s “norms, values and attendant institutions” (Kymlicka: 1989: 
166). Since the “norms” and “values” of the Amish community are to use traditional 
methods of the horse-drawn carriages and only marry within the community, 
“liberalising” the community by allowing members to sample life outside the 
community would dramatically alter the inherent “character” of the group. In other 
words, Kymlicka would be willing to change the character of a cultural community into 
something it is not.  
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Moreover, the consequences of Kymlicka’s willingness to liberalise non-liberal 
communities is that it can take away diversity. A multicultural society may be 
multicultural due to the diverse beliefs and practices, but structurally speaking, it 
becomes “homogenous” in the sense that they are all liberal in nature. A genuinely 
culturally diverse society contains communities from across the whole spectrum 
including liberal and non-liberal communities, and to insist on the liberalisation of the 
latter is to take away diversity. 
From this perspective, there is an implication that Kymlicka fails to appreciate 
cultural diversity in its own terms. That is to say, Kymlicka fails to recognise that since 
culture is valuable to its adherents, this is enough to justify the protection of that culture 
regardless of whether or not it promotes autonomy. Genuine diversity will inevitably 
involve an eclectic mix of communities from all backgrounds, whether they are liberal 
or non-liberal. However, Kymlicka’s instrumental approach implies that minority 
groups who endorse liberal standards are to be supported, while minority groups who 
do not are to be denied, unless they conform to liberal ways. Therefore, Kymlicka fails 
to give due recognition to the plurality of cultural diversity and essentially believes the 
inherent character of cultural diversity should be liberal.  
To appreciate cultural diversity in its own terms necessitates reflecting on the 
values and deficiencies of our own culture, a view that is echoed in the work of Bhikhu 
Parekh. He states that the diversity of cultures interacting in a multicultural society can 
be beneficial in the sense that other cultures can help us to reflect on our own culture 
and subsequently, we can ascertain its strengths and inadequacies (Parekh: 2006: 167). 
Cultural diversity from this perspective enables the enrichment and expansion of 
cultural knowledge and access to a broad spectrum of cultures is an important 
constituent of human freedom (Parekh: 2006: 167). In other words, this can help 
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individuals to appreciate and build on their existing cursory knowledge of cultures. It 
can help individuals to consider a different viewpoint and put themselves in the shoes of 
minorities in order to understand the various ways in which culture is valuable to 
minority communities. Parekh’s definition of culture essentially conveys the intrinsic 
value of cultural diversity. It has significant value to the adherents of that particular 
culture and that in itself is enough justification to warrant protection, as opposed to 
cultures being protected to ensure the promotion of autonomy. Parekh argues that while 
Kymlicka appreciates culture on one level, he rebuffs it on another level in that a liberal 
theory of culture lacks appeal for non-liberal minorities and hence is not sufficiently 
sensitive to the demands of a genuinely multicultural society (Parekh: 1997: 60). To 
fully appreciate the needs of a genuinely multicultural society involves a plural 
understanding of culture. However, Kymlicka’s conception seems to be based on a 
liberal understanding of culture. 
Conclusion 
With the increasing presence of cultural diversity in contemporary liberal societies, 
Kymlicka was the first major theorist to attempt to develop a set of minority rights from 
a liberal viewpoint and also attempted to endorse a set of minority rights that follows on 
from Marshall’s concept. However, ultimately, Kymlicka’s instrumental framework 
remains problematic. He makes an unduly sharp distinction between national and ethnic 
minority groups and the subsequent rights they are accorded. Some cultural minorities 
do not fall within either category and hence Kymlicka’s framework is not capable of 
delivering justice to these groups. It is also unhelpful given that it is possible for 
national minorities to be accorded rights specifically designated for ethnic groups and 
vice versa. In addition, the emphasis on the involuntary/voluntary incorporation 
distinction is unhelpful because it implies the cultures of national minorities are more 
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deserving of protection than the cultures of ethnic groups. Because of his undue 
emphasis on the promotion of individual autonomy, Kymlicka also fails to take into 
account the genuine diversity of cultures within contemporary multicultural societies. 
Ultimately, the liberal model he advocates fails to take into account the needs of 
cultural communities who are non-liberal in nature. This implies non-liberal cultures are 
not valuable since they do not foster autonomy. Since non-liberal cultural communities 
are not valued because they do not endorse autonomy or do not regard autonomy as a 
primary good, justice is to be denied to these groups.  
In the final analysis, Kymlicka fails to appreciate and understand culture in its 
own terms. Cultures can be valued and treasured because they can encompass a whole 
range of values including autonomy. Another implication of an autonomy-based 
approach is that by restricting his defence to autonomy, Kymlicka overlooks the 
multitude of ways in which individuals identify and relate to their culture. For example, 
some value their culture because it constitutes part of their identity in that their identity 
is tied up with the values, traditions and practices of a community and for this reason, it 
is difficult to relinquish; some value their culture out of a religious duty to obey their 
doctrine; some regard their cultural beliefs as something that cannot be revised or 
questioned; and some value their culture out of loyalty to their ancestors or of a desire 
to pass it down to future generations. As an alternative, there needs to be an account of 
the intrinsic value of cultural diversity. Kymlicka’s account of the value of cultural 
diversity is inadequate as it only values cultures as potential choice sets in living the 
good life.  
In contrast, framework of Bhikhu Parekh is worth considering as a credible 
alternative. As mentioned earlier, Parekh’s approach is to convey an intrinsic worth of 
cultural diversity where culture has value in itself, and also promote and manage the 
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relationship between the diverse cultures in a given society. For Parekh, the interaction 
between diverse communities allows individuals to be exposed to different values and 
belief systems which can expand and enrich the human condition. In simple terms, it 
opens the door to a variety of cultures that individuals may not have access to. The 




Chapter 3. Bhikhu Parekh’s value of culture 
Chapter 2 focused on Kymlicka’s conception of minority rights and whether it can 
constitute the fourth set of citizenship rights, following on from Marshall’s civil, 
political and social rights. It also highlighted the flaws of a liberal framework that is 
centred on the promotion of individual autonomy. Not all cultural communities view 
the promotion of individual autonomy as paramount. Although Kymlicka’s framework 
may capture the significance of cultural membership to individual well-being, it does 
not highlight the importance of cultural diversity as such. One theorist who does 
attempt to capture this is Bhikhu Parekh. For Parekh, multiculturalism is about the 
relationship between different cultural groups who all possess their own distinct and 
significantly meaningful practices and traditions: his theory centres on the 
institutionalised process of dialogue between these cultures (Parekh: 2006: 14). What 
underpins his commitment to an institutionalised process of dialogue is his belief that 
individuals are culturally embedded in the sense that their behaviour and values are 
deeply shaped by their membership of a cultural community.  
This chapter focuses on Parekh’s insights regarding the value of cultural 
diversity. It will argue that despite putting forward a persuasive case for the value of 
cultural diversity, his overall argument is undermined by a tacit association with 
liberalism. While Parekh highlights the limitations of a liberal framework and claims 
his overall framework transcends this, further analysis shows that Parekh’s approach 
remains rooted within the liberal trajectory. For example, firstly, the dialogical process 
he proposes as a solution to resolving contentious claims resembles a liberal outlook. 
Secondly, Parekh believes that every political community needs to develop a shared 
national identity. However, his conception of a national identity is grounded solely in 
politico-institutional terms, which reflects the common liberal approach of drawing a 
39 
 
sharp distinction between the public and private realms of society. In addition, because 
it is located solely in the political structure, this grounding may not be strong enough to 
sustain a genuine sense of belonging among the members of the polity.   
While the chapter will explore the difficulties inherent in Parekh’s position, it 
will also defend Parekh’s belief that in order to treat individuals equally, it is at times 
necessary to treat them differently. While this constitutes the bedrock of Parekh’s 
formulation of equality of opportunity, Parekh’s position has been criticised because a) 
his formulation renders culture a powerful force that dictates all actions of individuals 
and b) it advocates the notion of differential treatment as opposed to uniform treatment. 
This chapter will take this defence of Parekh to further emphasise the importance of 
cultural diversity and the importance of culture to individuals. It will conclude that 
despite conveying several key insights about the value of cultural diversity as a whole, 
the framework that he proffers ultimately remains problematic and rooted within a 
broadly liberal trajectory. The next section will begin with a brief look at the concept of 
value pluralism, as it underpins Parekh’s approach to the politics of multiculturalism. 
I: Value pluralism 
Recall Kymlicka’s attempt to develop a liberal theory of group-differentiated rights 
based on the promotion of liberal values, in particular individual autonomy. This 
liberal-minded approach is in stark contrast to the views of Parekh, who believes a 
multicultural society cannot be constructed on liberal principles alone. Since 
multicultural societies consist of multiple cultures and minority communities each with 
their own conception of the good, Parekh (2006: 13) believes a framework based on a 
particular set of principles is problematic. According to Parekh, a liberal set of 
principles can, at best, provide the conditions for liberal groups to flourish but not for 
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non-liberal groups or groups that do not attach primacy to liberal principles. While 
liberalism may be hospitable to some forms of cultural diversity, it remains too monistic 
and culturally specific. Ultimately, a liberal framework endorses a particular way of life 
that is perceived as morally “better” than others (Parekh: 2006: 14). According to 
Parekh, liberalism tends to universalise itself in terms of how to live the good life and 
thus uses its own standards to judge other cultures and their conceptions of the good 
life. In simple terms, while multiculturalism is often seen as an extension of liberalism 
and liberalism tends to define itself as the theory of multiculturalism, Parekh believes 
liberalism to be one conception of the good life among many others. As a result, Parekh 
endorses a position where liberalism is no more dominant than the other conceptions of 
the good life. Therefore, the principles of justice governing a multicultural society 
cannot involve liberal values alone, for this would exclude the presence and deny the 
legitimacy of non-liberal cultures (Parekh: 2006: 14). Instead, the principles of justice 
governing a multicultural society must contain principles that go beyond liberalism in 
that it should “…rise to a higher level of philosophical abstraction” (Parekh: 2006: 14).  
Parekh’s position here is underpinned by a commitment to value pluralism, 
which holds that “…fundamental human values are irreducibly plural” (Crowder: 2002: 
2) meaning there is no single conception of the “good life” but rather a variety of 
competing and equally legitimate ideas. The argument that human values are 
irreducibly plural therefore suggests that complete harmony among all values is 
impossible. People are bound to deviate in their views over what constitutes the good 
life as it is not possible to show the superiority of one conception over another 
(Heywood: 2007: 324). Therefore, it can be said that differing conceptions of the “good 
life” are “incommensurable” and cannot be compared (Crowder: 2002: 49). The idea 
behind this is that there are some things that are so distinct and different that there is no 
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common benchmark for individuals to ponder their worth or worthlessness. For 
example, a chair is distinctly different from a car and therefore values such as the 
sturdiness of the chair and the visual appeal of the car cannot be measured using a 
common benchmark. The same principle can apply to cultures. For Parekh, comparing 
cultures is logically incoherent because they each represent a unique conception of the 
good life, although he does acknowledge that we can compare specific aspects (Parekh: 
2006: 173). For example, we can show that the literary qualities of one culture are 
richer than another and we can show the spirituality of one is deeper than another 
(Parekh: 2006: 173). As Gray (2000: 34) notes, such comparisons may highlight 
differences in the interpretation of values in that one culture may hold a certain value in 
a higher regard than another culture or “...what some praise as virtuous others may 
condemn as a vice”. 
As a result, members of a multicultural society are likely to disagree about what 
constitutes the good life because it is not possible to show the moral superiority of one 
culture over another.  For example, while liberals would like to ban or at least 
discourage the practice of arranged marriage because it violates the values of personal 
autonomy and choice, those who engage in the practice may argue that it is an integral 
part of the Asian way of life (Parekh: 2006: 275). If one endorses values such as 
individual autonomy, then one could say the liberal culture in question is “better” than 
the Asian culture because it promotes individual autonomy, but this does not mean that 
it is on the whole “better”. In this instance, the concept of arranged marriage is being 
compared to see whether it meets the liberal standard of autonomy and because it does 
not, liberals are inclined to oppose the concept. According to Parekh, this is indicative 
of the current problems faced by minority groups - the morality of other cultures is 
being understood within a contextual background of liberal western ideas on how life 
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should be lived. For instance, a problem with discrimination and racism is that those 
who are the perpetrators often assume that their culture and the characteristics 
associated with it are the norm and anybody who deviates from this norm is deemed to 
be deviant. A tradition that may seem peculiar in one culture may actually tend to be the 
norm in another. For example, the social practice of bowing one’s head when greeting 
another person is a well-established practice in Japan. However, this may seem peculiar 
in western cultures where the traditional meet-and-greet convention is to shake the other 
person’s hand.  
However, in a liberal multicultural society, how should minority practices that 
are deemed offensive be handled? This question is central to Parekh’s approach to 
multiculturalism and group-differentiated rights, which seeks to combine a typically 
liberal emphasis on equal respect for diverse cultures with the promotion of genuine 
cultural diversity. Culturally diverse societies contain both liberal and non-liberal 
communities and these groups are likely to come into conflict. For that reason and to 
establish fair terms of justice, a rational debate is required in the form of intercultural 
dialogue. Parekh believes that through intercultural dialogue it is possible to come to a 
concrete resolution that suits all parties. 
Parekh believes such dialogue should take place within a set of “operative 
public values”. This, according to Parekh, constitutes the basic moral structure of 
society in that it consists of a set of values and rules that all individuals adhere to 
because society cherishes them, encourages its members to live by them and judges its 
members’ behaviour in terms of them (Parekh: 2006: 269). It constitutes a moral code 
that all individuals are expected to abide by. In simple terms, it could be described as 
“this is how we do things here”. In addition, they are “…regulated by a body of civic 
values and practices and constitute society’s civic culture” (Parekh: 2006: 269). Thus 
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the “operative public values” constitute the society’s common culture. Parekh stresses 
that these values are general in nature but nevertheless provide an acceptable starting 
point for public debate between the majority and minority because people’s initial 
judgements are based on these values (Parekh: 2006: 270). Furthermore, these values 
are not inviolable and are open to the possibility of revision themselves, especially if 
the resulting dialogue yields a mutual consensus (Parekh: 2006: 270). In essence, 
Parekh sees the “operative public values” as a framework within which genuine 
diversity can be accommodated because it allows minorities to present their case to the 
majority regarding contentious issues. For Parekh, a “good” multicultural society does 
not derive its principles from a pre-determined set of principles. Instead, principles must 
be dialogically constituted to meet the realities and challenges of a multicultural 
society. In addition, it should “…nurture a climate in which it can proceed effectively, 
stretch the boundaries of the prevailing forms of thought, and generate a body of 
collectively acceptable principles, institutions and policies” (Parekh: 2006: 340). Such a 
dialogically constituted society retains the spirit of liberalism and the value of cultural 
diversity.  
Examples of such dialogue could include issues such as animal slaughtering and 
arranged marriage. The Jewish and Muslim method of slaughtering animals has long 
been the subject of debate due to the supposed cruel nature of the way in which the 
animal is slaughtered. However, if subjected to intercultural dialogue, both sides of the 
argument is given in that the majority are enlightened as to why such a method is 
important to their respective cultures and the Jewish and Muslim communities are 
enlightened as to why kosher and halal methods of slaughter are perceived by the 
majority to be wrong. On this particular topic, both the Jewish and Muslim 
representatives may argue that although the animal is not stunned prior to death, this 
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does not necessarily mean the animal is subjected to horrific pain as the pain suffered is 
at best “minimal” and in general does not violate the “operative public values” of 
western liberal societies (Parekh: 2006: 274). In the dialogue regarding the practice of 
arranged marriages, the problem is that there is unease with the concept due to the 
perceptions of liberals that it violates personal autonomy and choice (Parekh: 2006: 
275). Parekh refutes this by arguing that it is interlocked with other practices, is an 
integral part of the Asian way of life, means a great deal to its adherents, and marriages 
are likely to be happier and last longer if parental consent is involved (Parekh: 2006: 
274-275). Another fact that supports the concept of arranged marriages is that romantic 
love as the basis for marriage has only existed since the nineteenth century and prior to 
then arranged marriages were the norm and actually served society well. On the view 
that it violates personal autonomy, Parekh notes that if those involved are happy to go 
through with it or have had a say in the decision then they have chosen to do so and 
therefore their choices should be respected (Parekh: 2006: 275).  
II: Culture and cultural diversity 
Parekh contends that because it is difficult to show that one culture is morally superior 
to another, the principles of justice governing a multicultural society should be based on 
the value of cultural diversity and should nurture an institutionalised dialogue between 
different cultural communities (Parekh: 2006: 13). Therefore, the politics of 
multiculturalism, for Parekh, is about managing the relationship between different 
cultural communities and trying to establish just and fair terms. Before moving on, it 
would be sensible to outline what Parekh defines as culture. He defines culture as a 
“…historically created system of meaning and significance or, what comes to the same 
thing, a system of beliefs and practices in terms of which a group of human beings 
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understand, regulate and structure their individual and collective lives” (Parekh: 2006: 
143). 
In addition, every culture is fluid and hence is a complex system with no 
defining identity that encompasses the moral life (Parekh: 2006: 145). In other words, 
cultures are not constituted by a fixed set of values and beliefs. Instead, cultures are 
constantly evolving and developing over time and it is this that structures the moral life. 
For Parekh, the moral life is concerned with what kind of life is worth living, what 
activities are worth pursuing and what form of human relations are worth cultivating 
(2006: 144). This bears a similarity to Kymlicka’s belief that we should lead life from 
the “inside”. Since cultures are constantly developing over time, they are constantly 
open to question and subject to change (Parekh: 2006: 148). For Parekh, therefore, 
culture plays an important role in the pursuit and revision of our conception of the good 
life. In order to choose our conception of the good life, we must form beliefs about the 
values of social practices; it is the culture that we live in that helps individuals to shape 
their beliefs. Furthermore, as cultures are constantly developing and open to question, 
cultural context and the conceptions of the good grounded in these contexts are open to 
revision. On the whole, Parekh sees culture as a vital component for human life because 
of the manner in which it structures all aspects of moral life. Furthermore, he argues 
that because human beings are culturally embedded and are deeply shaped by their 
communities (Parekh: 2006: 120), culture is indicative of who we are in that it affects 
and shapes our personalities and all aspects of moral life. It is therefore no surprise to 
find that Parekh regards a policy of assimilation as impossible. For Parekh, assimilation 
involves unviable views of a coherent and unified cultural structure and often fails in its 
promise of “full and unqualified acceptance” (Parekh: 2006: 197-198). There are two 
points to this. The first is that assimilation presumes a society where there is a fixed 
46 
 
cultural and moral structure, which contrasts with Parekh’s belief that cultures are not 
fixed and are constantly developing. The second is that even if individuals assimilated 
into the wider culture, there is always the danger of their past background being used as 
the basis for discrimination by the wider society (Parekh: 2006: 198).  
This view is also constitutive of Parekh’s commitment to value pluralism 
because assimilation essentially argues for minorities to abandon their culture: to 
abandon one’s culture is to relinquish all of one’s core beliefs and values and adopt the 
norms of the dominant majority. In contrast, Parekh’s commitment to value pluralism 
rests on the belief that there is no single conception of the good life that is superior to 
others. Indeed for Parekh, diversity of ways of life is in itself valuable. 
The value of cultural diversity arguably constitutes Parekh’s key contribution to 
the debate on multiculturalism. While, just like Kymlicka, Parekh endorses the use of 
group-differentiated rights and entitlements for minority groups, Parekh values cultural 
diversity in itself, whereas Kymlicka believes culture is valuable because it is 
conducive to autonomy. Parekh argues that a viable framework for a multicultural 
society must take into account the value of cultural diversity as a whole. He identifies 
several arguments that are often used to render diversity a desirable trait. Echoing 
Kymlicka’s position, one is that diversity expands freedom of choice and increases the 
available range of options (Parekh: 2006: 165). Although important, Parekh maintains 
that this argument is restrictive in that there is no good reason to value other cultures if 
they are simply options. After all, there is no good reason to value other cultures if one 
is perfectly content with one’s own. Another argument is that since individuals are 
culturally embedded, they have a right to their culture and therefore cultural diversity is 
inescapable. This argument is flawed because it shows why membership of one’s 
culture is important, but not why cultural diversity is valuable (Parekh: 2006: 166). 
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Another argument is that diversity creates a “rich, varied and aesthetically pleasing and 
stimulating world”, but Parekh believes that although this may be true, it is too vague to 
carry the moral burdens placed on it (Parekh: 2006: 166). By this, he means that 
cultures and cultural diversity cannot be justified simply because they offer a 
stimulating and aesthetically pleasing world. Instead, making the case for diversity 
involves recognising that cultures are moral systems that contain within them the ability 
to shape and influence the lives of their members.  
Parekh’s approach to the value of cultural diversity is different. He believes that 
although the above arguments have merits, we should regard cultures as valuable in 
themselves regardless of whether they are options for us, because this can remind us of 
the limitations of our own culture and can expand our intellectual horizons (Parekh: 
2006: 167). Reflecting his commitment to value pluralism, he argues that since human 
values are liable to conflict, every culture realises a limited range of potential values. 
Hence no culture can embody all that is valuable and, therefore, different cultures can 
correct and complement each other and also expand each other’s intellectual horizon 
(Parekh: 2006: 167). In other words, a diverse multitude of cultures can engage in a 
mutual process of adaptation and change.  For Parekh (2006: 168), cultural diversity 
creates an environment where different cultural communities can engage in a mutually 
beneficial dialogue. This ensures that the various cultures can learn from each other and 
can generate different perspectives and ideas that, on the balance of probability, would 
not occur in a culturally homogenous society (Parekh: 2006: 168). 
Furthermore, cultural diversity is an important constituent and condition of 
human freedom in that individuals cannot step out of their own culture unless they have 
access to another and it is this diversity that allows individuals to do so (Parekh: 2006: 
167). He argues that “unless human beings are able to step out of their culture, they 
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remain imprisoned within it…” and imagine “it to be the only natural or self-evident 
way to understand and organise human life” (Parekh: 2006: 167). The presence of 
various diverse cultures therefore allows individuals to view their culture from different 
perspectives, to identify its strengths and weaknesses and to deepen their understanding 
(Parekh: 2006: 167).  
Parekh also addresses an obvious potential criticism of the value of cultural 
diversity: one may be perfectly happy with one’s culture and see no reason for wanting 
access to an extended range of cultures as options. In other words, he is referring to the 
claim that a culturally homogenous society can offer just as much as, if not more than, a 
culturally diverse society. For Parekh, a culturally diverse society is better for 
individuals than a culturally homogenous society in terms of its principles and his case 
for cultural diversity is based on these foundations. Four arguments are put in favour of 
this. The first is that while a culturally homogenous society can promote solidarity and 
facilitate a sense of community among its members, it tends to become closed, 
intolerant and even oppressive (Parekh: 2006: 170). As a result, it lacks the conditions 
for its members to develop their intellectual capabilities, openness, tolerance and 
sympathy for other cultures (Parekh: 2006: 170). In other words, a culturally 
homogenous society is likely to be more hostile and intolerant towards individuals from 
minority backgrounds because members of the former are not exposed to other cultures 
on a daily basis therefore leading to a “fear of the unknown”.  
The second argument Parekh makes in favour of a culturally diverse society 
over a culturally homogenous society is that the former can reproduce all the desirable 
traits of the latter while the latter cannot reproduce all the desirable traits of the former 
(Parekh: 2006: 171). For example, a culturally homogenous society cannot reproduce 
the features of an intercultural dialogue though there is no reason to suggest that a 
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culturally diverse society cannot recreate the desirable characteristics of a culturally 
homogenous society such as solidarity and a sense of community (Parekh: 2006: 171).  
The third argument is that as a result of globalisation and the changing nature of 
modern society, a culturally homogenous society is irrelevant in terms of coping with 
the demands that diversity brings and is unrealistic if it thinks it can resist external 
influences (Parekh: 2006: 171) With money, people and ideas moving freely across the 
world and new technology coming of age, the introduction of new forms of thought and 
life is inevitable (Parekh: 2006: 171) Furthermore, as most societies are already 
characterised by cultural diversity, Parekh believes we should attempt to take advantage 
of the benefits diversity has to offer rather than attempt to create homogeneity. Besides, 
such an attempt constitutes an unrealistic solution given that it involves an unacceptable 
degree of internal repression, limited contact with the outside world, bans on foreign 
literature and travel and so on (Parekh: 2006: 171). The fourth argument Parekh makes 
is that cultural diversity recognises that the good life can be lived in a variety of ways 
including those that can be culturally homogenous. Therefore, although cultural 
diversity has more to offer than cultural homogeneity, we should respect the decisions 
of those who freely decide to live within a homogenous community because 
multiculturalism is “not committed to the view that only the culturally open way of life 
is best” (Parekh: 2006: 172): we can have culturally homogenous communities with a 
multicultural society. 
III: Parekh’s political structure 
Parekh argues that in the quest to foster unity and diversity, different multicultural 
societies have to devise their own common principles that together comprise society’s 
political structure (Parekh: 2006: 206). He offers his own interpretation of what 
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common principles should be employed in devising a political structure but stresses that 
this should be viewed as merely a “navigational device” (Parekh: 2006: 206). These are: 
structure of authority; justice; a common culture; a multicultural education; a national 
identity; and collective rights. To stay within the context of this thesis, only two will be 
highlighted – common culture and national identity. 
Common culture 
At first glance, the endorsement of a common culture would appear to be at odds with 
Parekh’s commitment to cultural diversity. While the idea of a common culture appears 
to imply uniformity and homogeneity, a commitment to diversity entails tolerance of a 
diverse range of values. 
Parekh, however, believes that a multicultural society can sustain unity and 
diversity. To achieve this, unity should be derived from encouraging its communities to 
establish an overarching common culture via interaction and dialogue (Parekh: 2006: 
219). It is through this process of interaction between different cultures that a 
multiculturally constituted overarching culture will develop (Parekh: 2006: 221). Since 
it evolves through the interaction between different cultures, it is internally plural and 
both unites and respects diversity. It is this common structure that not only holds 
society together and secures social unity, but it also embodies diversity in the sense that 
it is inclusive of all and is created by the interactions of different cultural communities 
(Parekh: 2006: 221). In other words, the development of a multiculturally constituted 
overarching culture is indicative of the balance between unity and diversity. Moreover, 
it is indicative of accepting differences as an integral feature of society. Since different 
cultural communities have helped to create this overarching common culture, they are 
also able to identify with and develop an emotional attachment to this culture. 
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Additionally, a multiculturally constituted culture forms a common sense of belonging 
among citizens and provides a basis of overlapping values that is derived from, and 
sustained by, a dialogue between them (Parekh: 2006: 224). This can be related back to 
the idea of “operative public values”, the very rules and values that bind a community 
of people together and embody a shared way of life. Because a multiculturally 
constituted common culture fosters a sense of belonging among citizens and provides a 
basis of overlapping values, it also fosters the development of the operative public 
values that underpin dialogue between communities.  In essence, what Parekh has in 
mind here is a thin overarching structure that sustains and holds society together.  
National identity 
A multicultural society should also endorse a pluralistic and inclusive view of national 
identity because, for Parekh, it is vital to establish a common sense of belonging among 
citizens. He believes a political community needs to develop an idea of the kind of 
community it is, what it stands for and how it differs from others (Parekh: 2006: 230). 
The purpose of such an identity is to communicate to citizens the reasons why they 
belong and form part of a single community. It should tie its members to a common 
self-understanding of what it is that they share in common and inspire them to live up to 
the collective perception of the community (Parekh: 2006: 232). He notes that a 
national identity can be a source for division in that it can fragment sections of the 
population because every definition of a national identity can be selective in what it 
promotes or the definition itself can belong to a particular group thus marginalising 
others (Parekh: 2006: 231). For example, debate continues about whether a British 
national identity is centred on Britain being a predominantly white and Christian 
society. This notion arguably marginalises minorities and alienates them from feeling 
they are legitimate members of society. Therefore, it is vital that a national identity is 
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conceived in a way that incorporates all members of society and not just members of a 
particular group (Parekh: 2006: 231). For Parekh, there are several strands to 
developing an effective national identity. First, he believes the identity of the political 
community should be located in the political structure of the society and not in the 
common interests and behaviour of its members. It should be defined in politico-
institutional terms (i.e. institutions, values and modes of public discourse) rather than 
ethno-cultural terms (Parekh: 2006: 231). Secondly, because members of a multicultural 
society can belong to various religious, ethnic and cultural groups, multiple identities 
should be recognised without incurring costs. For example, Parekh believes one can be 
both Scottish and British, Basque and Spanish and so on (Parekh: 2006: 232). Thirdly, a 
national identity should be defined in a way that includes all of its citizens and makes it 
possible for them to associate themselves with the identity. Parekh argues that minority 
groups cannot feel part of the community if its self-definition excludes them and treats 
them as outsiders (Parekh: 2006: 232). Finally, not only should national identity be 
inclusive but it should also accept all citizens as legitimate and equal members (Parekh: 
2006: 233). 
Parekh’s position here stems from his conception of equality. For Parekh, once 
we take cultural differences into account, treating people equally may at times require 
differential treatment. For example, in matters concerning equal opportunities, the 
opportunity in question should be accessible to all and to truly make it accessible to all, 
it needs to be interpreted in a culturally sensitive manner. For Parekh, an opportunity is 
only an opportunity if the individual possesses the “cultural disposition” and the 
necessary “cultural knowledge” to acquire it. This means that if a cultural aspect 
restricts an individual from acquiring an opportunity, then it was never an opportunity 
in the first place. For example, a Sikh male, in principle, possesses the opportunity to 
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send his son to a school that prohibits the wearing of turbans. However, because the 
Sikh religion requires its male adherents to wear the turban, the Sikh male, in practice, 
no longer possesses that particular opportunity because he lacks the “cultural 
disposition” to utilise the opportunity (Parekh: 2006: 241). Now, remove the rule 
banning turbans and the Sikh does have the opportunity to send his son to the school – 
the Sikh does possess the “cultural disposition”. However, it is not always as clear-cut 
as this. In certain circumstances, the cultural aspect that restricts one from acquiring the 
opportunity can be overcome with ease by reinterpreting and revising the cultural 
practice in question. For example, a Rastafarian with dreadlocks may be regarded as 
untidy in their appearance due to the nature of their hair. In a working environment 
where employees must be formally presentable and neat, the Rastafarian may be 
disadvantaged. To adapt to the requirement that all employees are presentable and neat, 
without getting rid of the dreadlocks, the Rastafarian can tailor the style of the 
dreadlocks to one that is presentable. In cases such as this, Parekh believes the minority 
should bear the cost involved in revising and reinterpreting the cultural practice. 
However, if it cannot be easily overcome and the practice is actually constitutive of the 
individual’s identity and would result in a deep sense of moral loss for the individual, 
then the state should bear most of the costs. Parekh argues that how costs should be 
distributed can be established through intercultural dialogue (Parekh: 2006: 241).  
IV: Critique  
On the whole, Parekh makes a worthy attempt to construct a framework that is capable 
of meeting the needs of contemporary multicultural societies. He gives several valuable 
insights. One is that we should regard cultural diversity as intrinsically valuable, as 
opposed to the instrumental benefits endorsed by Kymlicka. His view that diversity 
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stimulates and enables us to expand our cultural horizons and also offers a fresh 
perspective as to how we view the world is certainly insightful. However, there are 
some areas of Parekh’s framework that remain problematic. While Parekh argues that 
the ability of liberalism to accommodate genuine cultural diversity is limited because 
liberalism itself constitutes a comprehensive conception of the good, Parekh’s own 
framework ultimately remains grounded within liberalism. This has far-reaching 
implications for Parekh’s conception of intercultural dialogue because the conditions 
and principles governing dialogue also seem to resemble the outcomes of a liberal-
based dialogue. 
Another worry centres on Parekh’s conception of a national identity. As Parekh 
recognises, the concept of identity is a complex process and there are a multitude of 
ways in which individuals identify and define themselves. For example, some derive 
their identity from their religious, ancestral or ethnic background. Some may even 
derive their identity from frivolous characteristics. For example some individuals may 
ground their Scottish identity in an affiliation with the Scottish national football team, 
or the Scottish banter. The same can be said of the English and Welsh identity. This 
thesis will argue that despite his acknowledgement of the complexity of constructing a 
national identity, Parekh’s view that it should be defined purely in politico-institutional 
terms may prove to be challenging, given that statistics compiled by the CRE show that 
many citizens attach great significance to the very characteristics he believes are 
contentious: ethno-cultural characteristics.  
Although most of the remainder of this chapter is devoted to a critique of 
Parekh’s approach, the chapter will conclude with a defence of Parekh’s formulation of 
equality of opportunity. While critics such as Phillips (2007: 112) and Barry (2001: 34) 
have accused Parekh of advocating an overly deterministic view of culture, which 
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leaves little room for individual autonomy, this chapter will argue that such criticisms 
are based on a misrepresentation of Parekh’s conception of culture. Indeed, in practice, 
there are notable similarities between Parekh’s approach to particular controversial 
cases and that of Barry.  
Liberalism 
Recall Parekh’s argument that liberalism advocates a specific way of life and hence 
cannot provide an unbiased framework that accommodates all cultures (Parekh: 2006: 
14). Furthermore, although we live in a liberal society, the values of liberalism are on a 
par with other conceptions of how life should be lived (Parekh: 2006: 14-15). 
Essentially, the thrust of the argument here is that there is a danger that liberal values 
are being regarded as the de facto conception of the good life, especially in the west, 
and we must rein this in if we are to establish a fair and just multicultural society. 
Instead, Parekh believes an appropriate framework must be grounded in the principles 
of dialogue.  
Despite a worthy attempt to move to a higher philosophical vantage point than 
liberalism, critics have noted that Parekh’s framework ultimately resembles the very 
values that he is trying to diverge from (Kymlicka: 2001a: 132). For example, 
Kymlicka argues that the procedural aspect of Parekh’s dialogical framework is 
essentially the same as the liberal account of dialogue (Kymlicka: 2001a: 132). Parekh 
states that dialogue requires certain preconditions such as freedom of expression, basic 
ethical norms, equal rights, an accountable structure of authority and the empowerment 
of citizens (Parekh: 2006: 340). These, according to Kymlicka, are the key features of a 
liberal democracy. Moreover, according to Kymlicka, Parekh’s belief that a dialogue 
requires an education that promotes knowledge of other cultures as well as intellectual 
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curiosity and self-criticism, bears a marked resemblance to an education that is liberal 
in nature (Kymlicka: 2001a: 132-133). Kymlicka is also critical of the suggestion that 
Parekh’s approach differs from a liberal model because it allows religious minorities to 
offer religiously based arguments rather than secular reasons, and because non-liberal 
groups can challenge public norms that are liberal in character (Kymlicka: 2001a: 133). 
Kymlicka believes these so-called differences between Parekh’s model and the liberal 
model are mistaken because advocates of the latter model do not deny that individuals 
can advance such claims. Kymlicka argues that freedom of speech – a key liberal value 
- essentially guarantees the right for citizens to make claims grounded in non-secular 
and religious reasons. The difference is that in a pluralistic society, these reasons are 
unlikely to carry any real weight in public discourse because of the public/private 
distinction that is prevalent in liberal societies. Thus from a liberal perspective 
differences related to, for example, ethnicity and religion are “private” matters and are 
irrelevant to “public” life. 
Kymlicka also believes the likely outcomes of Parekh’s dialogical framework 
greatly resemble those of the liberal model. For example, the outcomes of a Parekhian 
style dialogue regarding arranged marriages resemble those of a liberal model 
(Kymlicka: 2001a: 133). Under a liberal model of dialogue, claims and arguments will 
be rejected if the group in question denies the status of their members as free and equal 
citizens, their capacity to form their own conception of the good life and their own 
sense of justice – all of which reflect Parekh’s principles for dialogue regarding 
contentious issues such as polygamy, female circumcision and arranged marriage 
(Kymlicka: 2001a: 133). This is a valid point. In Parekh’s discussion of polygamy, he 
imagines that during dialogue, a recurring concern would be that this practice violates 
the principle of gender equality, or “principle of the equality of the sexes” as he calls it 
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(Parekh: 2006: 284). To violate the principle of gender equality is to deny citizens their 
status as free and equal citizens, thus resembling the liberal model. Crowder echoes a 
similar sentiment stating that gender equality seems to be an ideal that has emerged out 
of a distinctively liberal perspective and to conclude that gender equality should prevail 
over sexist practices is surely to side with liberalism (Crowder: 2009: 13). 
Dialogue 
Recall Parekh’s principles governing intercultural dialogue. He says dialogue ought to 
take place under certain conditions, most notably under a set of “operative public 
values”. He defines “operative public values” as the basic moral structure of society, 
that is, a set of values all individuals understand, relate to and adhere to because society 
cherishes them and judges its members behaviour in terms of them (Parekh: 2006: 269). 
The objective of such dialogue is to allow minorities to voice the reasons for the 
practice in question and for the majority to voice their reasons for condemnation. 
Moreover, such dialogue will trigger “bifocal” dialogues that discuss not only the 
merits and demerits of the practice in question, but also call into question the validity of 
the operative public values (Parekh: 2006: 271). In the end, if both sides cannot come to 
a mutually satisfactory conclusion, Parekh states the operative public values ought to 
prevail (Parekh: 2006: 273). This effectively means the practice in question is 
prohibited and liberal values will take priority. 
According to Schuster (2006), if dialogue is as clear-cut as Parekh makes it out 
to be, then contentious practices such as female circumcision and the wearing of the 
headscarf would have previously been resolved. Parekh gives an example of how a 
dialogue would play out concerning female circumcision in children, giving reasonable 
and rational arguments for and against the practice. In the end, he concludes that it 
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needs to be banned. If both sides give legitimate arguments to defend and oppose the 
practice, then logically speaking, it would be difficult to see how one side would 
prevail. That is to say, if equally legitimate reasons are given for the continuation and 
outlawing of the practice, then it would appear an impasse has been reached, to which 
Parekh gives no guidance as to how to proceed. This undermines his position because, 
generally speaking, how can a practice be allowed to continue if compelling reasons are 
given against it and how can a practice be outlawed if equally compelling reasons are 
given in support of it? Moreover, because Parekh states that the operative public values 
would prevail in the event of both sides remaining unmoved on the matter, the minority 
practice in question would be banned and the minority community would lose out. 
This has several implications. It implies that, all things considered, the minority 
community would find themselves in a no-win situation, even if the rationale for 
engaging in the practice is acknowledged. That is to say, the majority may acknowledge 
and understand the reasons given by the minority yet remain adamant that the minority 
are in the wrong hence, the minority will lose out. Parekh states that a society has no 
obligation to accommodate a way of life at the expense of its own, especially if it 
remains unconvinced of the minority’s rationale (Parekh: 2006: 273). This is 
exemplified in Parekh’s discussion of female circumcision as he gives several 
arguments in favour of the practice and also gives several arguments against, with the 
conclusion that the practice should be banned because, among a number of reasons, it 
offends basic moral and universal values as well as the “operative public values” 
(Parekh: 2006: 276). 
 Furthermore, because minorities are likely to lose out in such dialogue, it could 
potentially call into question their future participation. As Schuster (2006) points out, 
adherents to cultural practices will always remain unconvinced of the reasons behind a 
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ban. This raises the question of when one side will decide whether there is any point in 
engaging in a dialogue if the other side cannot be persuaded (Schuster: 2006). For 
example, if Parekh’s form of intercultural dialogue were to occur in its current form, 
minorities may feel there is no point in participating if the majority cannot be convinced 
of their rationale and the practice would be prohibited under the society’s “operative 
public values”. A refusal to participate can then have damaging implications for social 
unity. The minority community may feel less inclined to participate in the wider society 
and be less inclined to integrate into the wider society. In addition, because the wider 
society has prohibited an integral part of their culture, the minority may feel that their 
culture has been undermined and their cultural identity has been disrespected. If 
minorities feel undervalued and disrespected, they will feel that their presence in 
society is unwelcome. Therefore, they will have no desire to participate and integrate in 
a society where they are not wanted. Furthermore, they have no reason to develop a 
belonging to their homeland. This may give rise to a less unified and more fragmented 
society. 
Schuster (2006) also points out that as long as intercultural dialogue consists of 
the give and take of reasons, the final outcome will not reflect the supposed aims, such 
as remedying the inequality between cultures and highlighting the importance of 
culture. If a dialogue is simply about one side trying to justify a contentious practice, 
the other side trying to justify its ban, with the “operative public values” to prevail if no 
mutually agreed consensus is reached, it loses sight of the original purpose, which is to 






It is worth recalling that for Parekh, the development of a common culture is vital to 
sustain the social unity of society. This common culture is to be derived from 
interaction and dialogue between communities. Furthermore, the dialogue and 
interaction takes place under a set of operative public values, which basically is a set of 
moral rules that binds its citizens together, to which they are expected to adhere, and 
which constitutes the society’s civic culture. 
Parekh believes that the national identity of a given society should be derived 
solely from the political structure of society, including the values, institutions and 
modes of public discourse. According to Parekh, ethno-cultural characteristics, such as 
habits and mannerisms, should be excluded from the concept of a national identity 
because they are too contentious and are not shared by all citizens. Instead, Parekh 
believes that the national identity should be grounded in the established political 
institutions and fundamental political values that all citizens are expected to share as 
members of a community. 
 However, there are arguably several flaws in this conception of national 
identity. The first issue to note is that Parekh’s strategy here is commonly used by 
liberals in response to the questions posed by cultural diversity. Like liberals, Parekh 
appears to draw a sharp distinction between the public and private sphere. This adds 
credence to the notion that Parekh is ultimately a “closet liberal”. The second issue to 
note is that locating the concept of a national identity solely in the political structure of 
society is too restrictive and potentially too thin to sustain a genuine sense of belonging. 
It is restrictive in the sense that it requires a separation of culture and politics (Modood: 
2005: 176). As Modood notes, Parekh’s account would, for example, rule out the 
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French and Welsh language as part of the French and Welsh national identity (Modood: 
2005: 176). The same logic could be applied to the English language in terms of a 
British national identity. However, the data collected in the CRE reports highlights the 
ability to speak the English language as a key factor in uniting the British people (CRE: 
2005: 30). This may well suggest that English could be a key aspect in the construction 
of a British identity. Yet, under Parekh’s criteria, the English language would not be 
incorporated despite it being one of eight key themes of Britishness, as identified in the 
CRE report. The other themes include national symbols such as the Union Jack and the 
Houses of Parliament, the British people, the geographical features of Britain, 
citizenship, British achievements, values and attitudes and British cultural habits and 
mannerisms. All these themes featured prominently in the responses of the participants 
to the CRE surveys. This gives rise to the worry that Parekh’s conception of 
formulating a national identity may in practice be too thin to sustain a genuine sense of 
belonging to a British identity. In other words, Parekh’s conception of a national 
identity may prove to be too narrow because it does not factor in any of the prominent 
themes of Britishness other than the political institutions and political values. 
Equality of opportunity 
The final line of critique this thesis wishes to explore relates to Parekh’s view regarding 
equality of opportunity. Phillips (2007: 112) and Barry (2001: 34) have criticised 
Parekh’s conception of equality of opportunity because they believe it implies that 
individuals are so deeply embedded in their cultural background that it will invariably 
dictate their future actions. Although Parekh may at times give this impression, this 
thesis believes this is not the case. Rather than compelling individuals to act in 
accordance with their cultural norms and beliefs, this thesis believes Parekh is simply 
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conveying the message that minorities hold their beliefs and practices in high regard 
and place a significant amount of value on these. 
First, recall that, for Parekh, an opportunity is subject-dependent in that it only 
exists if the individual possesses the “cultural disposition” to take advantage of it. If an 
individual does not possess the “cultural disposition” then the opportunity is not 
actually available to that individual. For example, Sikhs may lack the “cultural 
disposition” to utilise the opportunity to send their child to a school that prohibits the 
wearing of the turban. However, Parekh attempts to qualify this view by insisting that 
this lack of “cultural disposition” may be overcome by revising the practice in question. 
Only if the revision of the practice involves a deep emotional and moral loss should the 
state bear the cost (Parekh: 2006: 241). On the whole, what Parekh is trying to say is 
that equality properly understood involves taking into account similarities and 
differences. If the latter are relevant, differential treatment as opposed to identical 
treatment is required, and if it is not relevant then equal treatment in the sense of 
uniform treatment is justified (Parekh: 2006: 240). 
This view has attracted attention because in the eyes of his critics, his 
description implies that culture has such a strong hold that it undermines the capacity 
for autonomous decision-making. Anne Phillips (2007: 112), for example, argues that 
Parekh’s approach is misleading because it suggests the culture in question is 
compelling individuals to act in a certain way or the culture is bound up with one’s 
identity to such an extent that the ability to make autonomous decisions is severely 
lacking. In other words, individuals cannot make “culture-free” decisions or engage in 
“culture-free” actions because the decisions that they make or the actions that they 
engage in are all dictated by their cultural background. Phillips believes that in an 
attempt to make his argument hold weight, Parekh presents religious and cultural 
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beliefs as something that can incapacitate people with regard to making autonomous 
decisions. On Phillips’ reading, Parekh employs this cultural dependency to justify legal 
exemptions for minorities (Phillips: 2007: 108-109). If we are to extend equality of 
opportunity to the “cultural disposition” of individuals, it raises the contentious issue of 
just how much sway a culture has over an individual (Phillips: 2007: 108). 
Brian Barry also objects to Parekh’s formulation of equality of opportunity. The 
objection is that all laws and policies burden some people more than others and Barry 
believes it is absurd to say that those who are burdened are unfairly treated and deserve 
some kind of special treatment (Barry: 2001: 34). Instead, Barry believes that if we are 
to grant exemptions, we need to establish that the reasons behind the exemption are 
compelling enough to show that the law itself was deficient in the first place. Like 
Phillips, Barry rejects the idea that culture compels individuals to act in a certain way. 
Part of the worry here appears to stem from the rise of so-called “cultural defence” 
cases. Barry claims that theorists of multiculturalism have actually abused culture to 
justify illegal or immoral actions by arguing that cultural membership predisposes or 
even forces people to behave in certain ways and to commit actions that violate liberal 
values. However according to Barry, to attempt to justify an action simply by reference 
to one’s culture fails to adopt a moral perspective (Barry: 2001: 253). For example, 
turkey is the most commonly consumed meal on Christmas Day. If A asks B “why are 
you having turkey on Christmas Day?” and B replies “it is tradition to have turkey on 
Christmas Day”, B’s answer essentially reflects what Barry said about failing to adopt a 
moral perspective. However, if B had answered something along the lines of “because I 
want to”, or “it is delicious”, B would still be engaging from a moral perspective. 
However, if B bases his answer solely on the assertion that “this is part of my culture”, 
B is not arguing from a moral perspective because the justifications for the act are not 
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based on autonomously held reasons, such as “because I want to”, or “because I choose 
to”. Yet, Barry misses the point. Since he does not regard culture as valuable, he fails to 
see the significance and profound effect it can have on individuals who hold their 
culture in high regard. If after careful deliberation and reflection an individual still 
believes in upholding a cultural tradition because it is important to the culture’s way of 
life and its members, then an argument grounded in “it is tradition” will still be morally 
valid. For example, if B now replies, “yes I have thought about it and my answer 
remains the same. I have eaten turkey every Christmas with my family and friends since 
I can remember. It reminds me of many happy memories and I genuinely think 
Christmas Day would not be the same without a turkey dinner”, then the answer appeals 
to tradition but at the same time still engages a moral perspective because the answer 
was determined after careful and rational thinking.  
Both Barry and Phillips present Parekh’s argument as culture compelling 
individuals to act in certain ways and this thesis believes that this reading misses the 
nuanced nature of Parekh’s argument. This thesis believes that Parekh is trying to 
convey the message that individuals are culturally embedded in the sense that culture 
constitutes an important part of who we are as individuals. It plays an influential role in 
shaping the identity of individuals and also the beliefs and convictions individuals hold 
in leading the good life. However, at the same time, Parekh tries to convey that 
individuals are not culturally determined. That is to say, the significance and value of 
culture does not compel individuals to act in certain ways. Individuals are capable of 
adapting and revising cultural practices if need be. However, change is associated with 
costs and if the costs are substantial, the argument becomes a debate about who bears 
these. On the one hand, if one regards culture as a product of individual choice, which 
Parekh does not, and Barry does, the minority community in question bears the cost. If, 
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on the other hand, one accepts the significance of cultural membership, as Parekh does, 
then it would be unfair to expect minorities to bear the very substantial costs associated 
with changing the practices and beliefs that are fundamental to the community’s way of 
life. Therefore, compensation is required to alleviate the burdens associated with this 
cost, which may be in the form of exemptions and differential treatment. Furthermore, 
Parekh does not accept that we should accommodate every claim for cultural 
accommodation, which Phillips’ and Barry’s critiques imply he does.  
Earlier, this thesis highlighted that in certain circumstances, Parekh believes the 
cultural aspect that restricts an individual from taking an opportunity can be overcome 
by reinterpreting or revising the practice. If the practice cannot be revised without a 
deep sense of emotional loss, the state should bear the cost. Therefore Parekh should 
not be taken to argue that culture compels us to act in certain ways, but should be seen 
as defending the more common claim that individuals are culturally constituted and that 
individual identities are shaped by their membership of a particular culture.   
Furthermore, as Parekh notes, his multicultural position is not all that different 
from the position defended by his critics. In a direct reply to Barry, Parekh argues that 
their positions on particular contentious issues are actually similar, even if their 
reasoning differs. For example, should Sikh children be allowed to wear turbans in 
schools that require a school uniform? According to Parekh, multicultural theorists 
would say yes on the grounds of equal opportunity and respect for differences and 
Barry’s answer would also be yes partly because of equal opportunity and partly 
because turbans do not affect the effective functioning of the school (Parekh: 2002: 
147). Should French schools allow Muslims to wear headscarves? Parekh says 
multicultural theorists would say yes because it does not undermine French secularism, 
shows respect for diversity, cultivates mutual tolerance; and because French schools 
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allow Christian symbols to be displayed (Parekh: 2002: 147). Barry also agrees that 
Muslim girls should be allowed to wear the headscarf for the first and third 
multiculturalist reasons, and also because the headscarf does not affect the effective 
functioning of the school (Parekh: 2002: 147). As Parekh points out, the interesting 
thing to take from this is that despite their consensus on such matters, the reasons for 
their positions are different (Parekh: 2002: 148). Parekh argues, for example, that 
multicultural theorists would refer to the principle of respect for diversity as the basis 
for exemptions from general rules whereas Barry would not. In contrast, Barry justifies 
exemptions on considerations of justice. Take the case of the Sikh schoolboy and the 
school prohibiting turbans on the basis that it does not comply with the dress code. To 
Parekh, and other multicultural theorists, the school is wrong for not exempting the 
Sikh child as all children should have the equal opportunity to attend their preferred 
school, and since their preferred school effectively bans turbans and thus imposes a 
restriction on the child that others are free from, he is treated unequally. If the school 
were to exempt the child, he would not be restricted and therefore would be treated 
equally (Parekh: 2002: 148). In contrast, Barry’s reason for exempting the child is that 
the turban does not interfere with the effective functioning of the school, and therefore 
to prohibit those with religious headgear from attending a school with a uniform policy 
is to deny them access to utilising their equal opportunity to attend that school. This 
reason is based on consequentialist grounds rather than respect for diversity. 
As a whole, this thesis endorses the differential approach over the universal. The 
latter may be prima facie appealing because it appeals to the ideal of universal treatment 
where individuals are treated equally regardless of their race, gender, cultural 
background and so on: however, once the approach of universal treatment is scrutinised, 
it is clear to see it disadvantages minority groups, hence the need for a differential 
67 
 
approach. The universal approach regards exemptions as one of “…utilitarian 
calculations, which are inherently inconclusive, which is contingent, patronising and 
creates the impression that those involved are being privileged or pampered” (Parekh: 
2006: 356). However, this thesis believes this is a misleading way to view exemptions. 
Because the default culture of society is that of the dominant majority group, the 
universalist approach privileges the dominant majority group and disadvantages cultural 
minorities. In other words, the minority culture is viewed as “deviant” and somehow 
less than “normal”. Consequently, minorities are disadvantaged because their cultural 
background is not reflected in the norms of the dominant culture, or in Kymlicka’s 
terms, the societal culture. Only a differential approach which takes cultural factors into 
account can ensure that minorities are placed on an equal footing with the majority. 
Parekh gives the example of a British Asian girl who had asked for her marriage to be 
annulled on the grounds of duress because she had been threatened with ostracism by 
her family (Parekh: 2006: 248). After initially declining, the court voided the marriage 
because it took the view that although acute social pressure did not amount to duress for 
a British white girl, it did so for her Asian counterpart due to the fact that ostracism 
virtually amounts to social death in Asian society (Parekh: 2006: 248). Equality 
therefore requires that actions should be equal in relevant circumstances. By applying 
the same judgment in both cases, the British Asian girl was left at a disadvantage. By 
applying a differential approach, the British Asian girl was put on an equal footing with 
her white counterpart. It therefore suggests a contextual approach is necessary because 
certain actions and situations will have different meanings and consequences which 






While the previous chapter highlighted how Kymlicka’s instrumental approach to 
culture can help to realise values such as autonomy, it also explored the limitations of 
his approach. For example, it does not convey the message that a culture can be 
valuable in itself. Given that modern societies contain within them a variety of cultural 
minorities with distinct beliefs and practices, Kymlicka, on the one hand, only 
advocates the worth of cultures who live up to liberal standards. Parekh, on the other 
hand, seeks to show that culture is valuable in itself. Thus Parekh seeks to give all 
cultures their due worth, whereas Kymlicka’s framework only attaches value to cultures 
that live up to certain standards. Parekh argues that the exposure to other cultures and 
beliefs not only expands our knowledge, but also gives us the chance to evaluate our 
own cultural practices and alter any misconceptions we may have. For Parekh, cultural 
diversity matters because no one culture can embody all values. Via a climate in which 
cross-cultural interaction is the norm, different cultures can learn from each other in that 
they can criticise and complement each other while expanding their intellectual 
knowledge. 
Underlying this is the idea of value pluralism. Using value pluralism, Parekh 
attempts to convey the idea that there is no one culture that is morally superior over 
another because the “good life” can be lived in a number of ways. Different cultures 
possess many different values and beliefs and more often than not interpret these values 
and beliefs differently. This means that there is no one standard to determine which one 
culture can be shown to be superior to another. It is possible to compare specific aspects 
of a culture using a common benchmark, for example, one can compare the Sikh culture 
to the Jewish culture in terms of autonomous capabilities. However, if it is found that 
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one fares better than the other on this specific dimension, it does not mean that this 
culture is “better” overall.  
Despite Parekh’s useful insights into the value of culture, his framework for 
governing the relationship between the majority society and minority communities 
remains flawed. He claims his approach proffers a higher philosophical vantage point 
than liberalism, but in reality it resembles a liberal framework in several respects. For 
example, equal rights and freedom of expression are core liberal values and yet Parekh 
employs these as a precondition for dialogue. Moreover, in dialogues regarding issues 
such as polygamy, Parekh envisages gender equality as the core principle at stake here 
and argues that to violate such a principle would be to deny individuals their status as 
free and equal citizens. Finally, in cases where the parties cannot reach agreement, 
Parekh argues that established operative public values must prevail, thus the minority 
will lose out and liberalism will prevail. 
Moreover, stemming from the classic liberal strategy of drawing a distinction 
between the public and private realms of society, Parekh’s grounding for a national 
identity could prove to be demanding in practice, considering he locates it exclusively 
in the political structure. Given that survey data shows citizens attach great meaning 
and importance to ethno-cultural characteristics, the same characteristics he believes are 
too contentious and divisive to carry forward in composing a national identity, the idea 
of a political-based overarching identity does not appear to be realistic. Government 
data compiled by the CRE suggests that Parekh’s conception of national identity will 
fail to sustain a genuine sense of belonging due to the restrictive content his concept is 
based on. For example, the CRE identified eight predominant themes of Britishness 
indicating that to base the concept of a national identity solely on the political structure 
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is exceedingly restrictive if it is to foster a sense of common belonging among citizens 
and retain the spirit of a culturally diverse society.  
While critics such as Barry and Phillips have accused Parekh of an overly 
deterministic conception of culture which leaves little room for individual autonomy, 
Parekh’s conception is arguably far less rigid than critics suggest. Indeed Parekh 
stresses that when it comes to contentious cultural practices, it is the minority who 
should adapt and revise. Only where such adaptation would result in deep moral loss for 
the individual should the state carry the majority of the costs through the provision of 
group-specific minority rights. Indeed, as Parekh notes, the specific resolutions he 
proposes for a range of issues are essentially similar to those advocated by Barry. While 
Barry and Parekh differ in terms of the justifications they offer in favour of the 
resolutions they propose, this chapter has argued that ultimately Parekh’s rights-based 
approach is more desirable than Barry’s approach. The following chapter will consider 
the extent to which a liberal account grounded in an appeal to universalism can respond 
to the issues raised in Parekh’s account. To do so, the chapter will explore Brian 




Chapter 4. Brian Barry’s universal citizenship 
So far, this thesis has examined the concept of citizenship via the works of Marshall, 
Kymlicka and Parekh. Via the works of Kymlicka and Parekh, it was highlighted that in 
the context of cultural diversity, their works remain problematic because the former is 
grounded in the promotion of autonomy, while the framework of the latter resembles a 
liberal conception despite claiming it goes beyond it. Marshall’s conception of 
citizenship establishes the foundations of what is required to fulfil equal citizenship. It 
consists of civil, political and social rights. Marshall believes equal citizenship and 
socio-economic inequalities cannot be readily reconciled and focuses on alleviating 
these inequalities through the redistribution of resources. This position is similar to that 
of Brian Barry. For instance, Marshall emphasises the importance of social rights and 
how minimum provisions such as health care and education can eliminate the impact of 
differences in social status. More significantly, Barry believes that the increasing 
awareness of cultural diversity and multiculturalism are starting to take precedence over 
the issues he considers more important such as economic justice, equality of 
opportunity and the politics of redistribution in general. His aim is to show how the 
position of an egalitarian liberal is incompatible with the promotion of cultural and 
group rights. Furthermore, the increasing limelight on culture has led theorists such as 
Kymlicka and Parekh to propose multicultural programmes in order to deal with the 
issues raised and it is these programmes Barry has a real disdain for.  
The next section begins with a brief overview of Barry’s position. As an 
egalitarian liberal with a fundamental commitment to equality and universal rights, he 
seeks to defend such principles due to his belief that they are being eroded by the 
growing demands of multicultural politics. That is to say he opposes attempts to replace 
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the liberal conception of citizenship with a model that gives group-differentiated rights 
to certain cultural communities. Barry dismisses the worry that a liberal conception of 
citizenship does not give due weight to the needs of cultural minorities and argues that 
equal treatment means uniform treatment. 
This chapter will argue that Barry’s approach to managing cultural diversity is 
inadequate because it is guided by a failure to appreciate the significance and 
compelling nature of culture. Not only is Barry mistaken in viewing cultural and 
religious beliefs and identities as products of individual choice, but also his response to 
the rule-and-exemption approach favoured by multiculturalists such as Parekh is 
problematic on two counts: (a) where Barry concedes that exemptions are justified, he 
arguably misrepresents the grounds for such exemptions; and (b) even based on Barry’s 
own criteria, exemptions can be justified more frequently than he acknowledges. The 
chapter will conclude that a liberal framework based on universalism cannot sustain a 
genuine multicultural society because it fails to recognise that equality properly 
understood will mean that it may be necessary to go against the principle of uniform 
treatment and treat individuals differently. 
I: Barry’s position 
Barry’s position on multiculturalism can be derived from two main sources: a 
fundamental commitment to equality and universal human rights and an argument 
against group rights that is entrenched in liberal egalitarianism. The focus of his attacks 
is advocates of multiculturalism whose general argument includes: 
...the conception of equal citizenship embodied in equal rights needs to be 
replaced by a set of culturally differentiated rights (Barry: 2001: 9) 
that failure to offer special treatment is in some circumstances itself a kind 
of unequal treatment. For, it is said, the same law may have a different 
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impact on different people as a result of their religious beliefs or cultural 
practices. Thus, the liberal claim that equal treatment is generated by a 
system of uniform laws is invalid (Barry: 2001: 34) 
 
Barry claims these arguments are wrong. To refute these claims, he outlines and 
defends the liberal credentials he believes multicultural theorists seem to reject. For 
example, traditionally, liberalism has been committed to a notion of universal 
citizenship rights. Equal rights as citizens mean the inclusion of all in the political 
community. Discrimination on the grounds of race, gender, social class and so on is to 
be avoided by treating everyone equally (uniform treatment), a principle advocated 
passionately by Barry. Barry therefore favours a unitary conception of citizenship. This 
notion of citizenship is entrenched in the liberal ideal of a distinction between the 
“private” and “public” sphere. Differences between and among people that are related 
to, for example, ethnicity and religion are viewed as “private” matters, and thus are 
irrelevant to the status of a person in the “public” sphere. For Barry, cultural-based 
activities are private choices that individuals make and any cost deriving from these 
activities should be borne by the individual. This stems from the egalitarian liberal view 
that justice requires equal rights and opportunities, but not necessarily equal outcomes 
(Barry: 2001: 92). For example, if two people have the same amount of resources and 
opportunities and one chooses to utilise them differently from the other, the end result 
would still be justified regardless of whether or not one comes off worse than the other 
due to the fact it was down to choice. This constitutes a version of “luck 
egalitarianism”. Generally speaking, “option luck” refers to how deliberate and 
calculated risks might turn out. This refers to the possibility of benefitting or losing out 
as a result of anticipation and analysis of an action (Dworkin: 2000: 73). Whether an 
individual benefits or loses is justified provided the decision was consciously made to 
go through with the action. In contrast, “brute luck” represents outcomes that occur 
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through no fault of the individual in the sense of “...not being the product of deliberate 
gambles” (Dworkin 2000: 73). Furthermore, Dworkin believes that individuals should 
be compensated if they suffer as a result of “brute luck” but not if they suffer as a result 
of “option luck” (Dworkin: 2000: 287). For Barry, cultural and religious beliefs are best 
viewed as “option luck”. This is because he believes the practices and beliefs of a 
particular culture are choices that individuals consciously and freely make. Therefore, if 
an individual is restricted by the requirements of their culture, any costs that arise 
should be carried by the individual. 
Barry believes that it is these costs that are now seeping into the “public” 
domain. That is to say, cultural matters usually regulated in the private domain are now 
beginning to clash with the public domain and this is the issue that has caused tensions 
between Barry and advocates of multiculturalism. The latter, such as Parekh, believe 
that in some cases, cultural commitments fall under the category of “brute luck”. For 
Parekh, in some circumstances, equality properly understood means cultural 
backgrounds must be taken into account, given that individuals are culturally 
constituted. For example, the Sikh requirement to wear the turban clashes with the law 
that requires motorcyclists to wear a crash helmet. Parekh interprets this case as akin to 
“brute luck” and argues that because their religion requires them to wear the turban, 
Sikhs are culturally disadvantaged by the law and an exemption would relieve this 
disadvantage. Barry, however, disagrees because he believes in the strict application of 
the law on the grounds of health and safety and that nobody is bound to ride a 
motorcycle (Barry: 2001: 44-45). Furthermore, he generally believes that following the 
practices of a given culture is a product of individual choice. For Barry, debates 
surrounding such legal exemptions are indicative of the manner in which questions of 
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culture are beginning to dominate political theory at the expense of a focus on more 
important socio-economic issues (Barry: 2001: 9).  
Commitment to equality and universal treatment 
As a staunch egalitarian liberal, Barry advocates the principle of equality and the 
underlying theme of equality means that liberals should not ignore the disparities 
between, for example, the rich and poor and the highly literate population and illiterate 
population. Barry believes such issues are products of social circumstances and 
injustices, rather than consequences of individual choice as he does regarding culture. 
He believes liberalism is not culturally relative and any notion that liberal rights are 
dependent on public acceptance of the equal value of cultures is misguided. He is more 
concerned with principles such as distributive justice and equality rather than cultural 
differences because the former principles are applicable to all citizens; consequently he 
would prefer to focus on narrowing the gap between the rich and poor and raising 
literacy levels. For Barry, culture and religion are choices individuals make and hence 
individuals are responsible for the costs they may incur as a result of these choices. 
Barry is also committed to the notion that groups of people are likely to be 
similar in terms of human nature and that people of all groups, regardless of differences, 
can share the same goals and objectives. The crucial point is that differences should not 
have an impact on citizen’s standing in the public realm. Therefore, it is important that 
all people are treated equally regardless of their culture as he believes uniformity of 
treatment is predominantly superior to privileging individuals or groups on the basis of 
their culture (Barry: 2001: 10). Barry also notes that the current unitary model of 
citizenship was developed in response to the wars of religion that made Europe such a 
living hell in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries and argues that because it brought 
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an end to those wars, there is no reason to suggest it cannot do the same for religious 
and cultural differences today (Barry: 2001: 21). This relates back to his belief that 
liberal conceptions of citizenship are universal. Thus every individual is to be treated 
the same, namely with equal citizenship rights. He states “[i]n a liberal society, 
common legal status as a citizen should, ideally, be translated into equal treatment...” 
(Barry: 2001: 269). 
Equality of opportunity  
According to Barry, equality of opportunity requires that individuals have the same 
choice sets in life and it is what one does with these that matters. Within the boundaries 
set out by the choice sets, people are free to choose and live by the decisions they make. 
If the decisions made lead to unequal outcomes, the state has no role in attempting to 
remedy the inequality suffered because, in Barry’s eyes, as long as the range of 
opportunities is available to all, there is no injustice involved (Barry: 2001: 92-95). For 
example, participants may leave the starting blocks at the same time, but not all are 
expected to finish the race at the same time; it is precisely the “equal start” to the race 
that makes unequal outcomes just (Heywood: 2004: 289). Barry believes those who are 
equally qualified to do a job should have an equal chance of getting the job and those 
who are equally qualified but are denied an equal chance of getting the job are 
discriminated against (Barry: 2001: 55). Furthermore, Barry makes a crucial distinction 
between the range of opportunities available and the choices made within that range 
because he believes multicultural theorists such as Parekh obscure this fact. If an 
individual has the ability to carry out an action but chooses not to do it because their 
cultural background is prohibiting them from doing it, then it must not be forgotten that 
that person still had the opportunity to carry it through. This is in contrast to Parekh’s 
conception of opportunity. As described in Chapter 3, Parekh believes an opportunity is 
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a subject-dependent concept and having an opportunity also requires that the individual 
has the cultural disposition to take advantage of it. In other words, Parekh believes the 
idea of equal treatment involves taking into account similarities and differences. Where 
differences are relevant, a due regard for equality requires differential treatment 
(Parekh: 2006: 240).  
Barry’s opposition to group rights 
Barry’s opposition to group rights stems from his belief that culture is a matter of 
individual choice and therefore we as individuals are responsible for any costs incurred. 
This position is in stark contrast to Parekh and Kymlicka. Parekh believes culture, and 
indeed cultural diversity, is valuable because human beings are culturally embedded 
and the culture we are raised in deeply shapes and structures our whole lives. Kymlicka 
believes culture to be valuable in that it not only provides us with a background for 
choices, but also helps us make meaningful decisions.  
Barry is opposed to group rights because he believes such rights tend to benefit 
particular individuals rather than the group as a whole (Barry: 2001: 113). Therefore, in 
Barry’s opinion, group-differentiated rights produce inequalities. How this tends to 
manifest itself is in the form of public policies – negative and positive – with the former 
tending to provide relief from the burdens imposed by a law and the latter tending to 
create beneficial advantages for individuals belonging to a culturally defined group that 
are not available to others (Barry: 2001: 17). Barry rejects such policies because he 
believes that in practice they tend to benefit the least disadvantaged individuals 
belonging to minority groups. For example, he notes that on the whole, American 
blacks are disadvantaged yet there is a rise in the number of flourishing middle-class 
Blacks and it is their children who tend to be the main beneficiaries of policies such  as 
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preferential admissions to universities (Barry: 2001: 115). This is because the children 
of flourishing middle-class Blacks tend to go to the best schools and achieve the highest 
test scores, hence they are the least disadvantaged. Thus these children benefit unfairly 
when in actual fact they should be competing within the general competition (Barry: 
2001: 115). For Barry, “What equality of opportunity means in relation to employment 
is that those who are equally well qualified to do a job have an equal chance of getting 
the job” (Barry: 2001: 54-55). Therefore if an individual were to unduly benefit as a 
result of some form of group-differentiated right or policy, it makes a mockery of 
equality of opportunity.   
In terms of laws, the rule-and-exemption approach is a feature of multicultural 
politics that particularly irks Barry. Best exemplified in the work of Parekh, the rule-
and-exemption approach is the view that equality requires differential treatment for 
cultural minorities and that in some cases, minorities should be exempt from existing 
laws because the law in question disadvantages them because of their cultural beliefs or 
practices (Barry: 2001: 33). Barry’s objection to this line of reasoning is that all laws 
burden some people more than others and it is absurd to say that those who are 
burdened are unfairly treated and deserve some kind of special treatment (Barry: 2001: 
34). For example, laws banning smoking in public places and speeding will hinder 
those who like to smoke and drive fast (Barry: 2001: 34), and this in itself is not a 
justifiable reason for exemptions. According to Barry, the same principle applies to 
cultural minorities: the fact that a law may hinder an individual because of their cultural 
status is not a justifiable reason to grant an exemption. Barry argues that in contrast to 
the approach advocated by multiculturalists, the reasons for exemption must be 
compelling enough to both override and retain the original law. In other words, the 
general rule and the exemption must be justified. However, this he believes will be rare 
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and that on the whole it is difficult to justify the rule-and-exemption approach (Barry: 
2001: 42). For example, he supports the exemption case of the turban-wearing Sikh boy 
who was refused admission to a private school on the basis that he failed to comply 
with the school uniform policy (Barry: 2001: 61-62), while arguing against the 
exemption allowing Sikhs to ride motorcycles without a crash helmet. On the one hand, 
while a school uniform may promote a sense of identity and community among the 
pupils, the dress code is not essential to the school’s task of educating children.   
Motor cycle crash helmets, on the other hand, are essential to enhancing road 
safety. This is central to Barry’s objection to the exemption allowing Sikhs to operate 
motorcycles without a crash helmet. The law that requires one to wear a crash helmet is 
made and applied in the name of safety measures and Barry is of the opinion that any 
interference with religion is justified in the name of safety (Barry: 2001: 44) because 
the turban is not an adequate substitute for a crash helmet. Moreover, he points out that 
Sikhs are prevented from riding a motorcycle because of the requirements of their 
religion rather than the actual legal requirement to wear a crash helmet (Barry: 2001: 
45). This should not be confused with denying them the equal right to operate a 
motorcycle. Lord Widgery’s remark “No one is bound to ride a motorcycle” is 
important for Barry because he believes that the remark effectively dismisses claims 
that the law requiring all those who operate a motorcycle to wear crash helmets actually 
infringes upon the guarantee of religious freedom enshrined in the European 
Convention of Human Rights (Barry: 2001: 44). This view reflects Barry’s claim that 
culture and religion are a matter of choice and that individuals should be responsible for 
the costs they may incur as a result. Furthermore, with regard to the illegal act of 
carrying a knife and other sharp objects in a public environment, the Criminal Justice 
Act of 1988 allows Sikhs to carry their kirpans in public places on the grounds of 
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religious freedom (Barry: 2001: 38). Again, according to Barry, unequal treatment is 
involved here as Sikhs are immune to punishment from what seems to be a perfectly 
legitimate law. Bhikhu Parekh seems to endorse this legal exemption arguing that this 
constitutes equal treatment and is not discriminatory because the religious requirements 
of non-Sikhs have not been ignored and non-Sikhs do not suffer adversely as a result of 
the law respecting the religious requirements of the Sikhs (Barry: 2001: 38). However, 
Barry criticises this view and argues that if the law’s underlying principles and logic are 
sound, there is no reason to grant exemptions. Barry believes that the concerns with 
road safety in the case of the motorcycle crash helmets and the protection of unarmed 
citizens in the case of the kirpan provide sufficient justification for the laws in question. 
He also criticises Parekh’s view of the inequalities generated as a result of such laws. 
Parekh states that on the surface, there are inequalities in that Sikhs can do what others 
cannot. However, this inequality arises out of the “different demands of the same basic 
right to religion and does not confer a new right on the Sikhs” (Parekh: 2006: 249). 
However, Barry does not care for Parekh’s reasons and believes the inequality of rights 
is real (Barry: 2001: 38). If one person is allowed to perform an act that others cannot, it 
constitutes an inequality. 
II: Critique 
This critique section aims to highlight the flaws inherent in Barry’s position regarding 
multicultural policies. Ultimately, it will highlight three overlapping points: (a) where 
Barry conceives of equality as same or identical treatment within the context of cultural 
diversity, such a conception of equality benefits the majority society and burdens 
cultural minorities; (b) Barry’s conception of culture as a product of individual choice is 
misleading; and (c) Barry’s own account of the rule-and-exemption approach is far 
more accommodating to claims for exemptions than he acknowledges. 
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Is universal citizenship appropriate for cultural minorities? 
Barry’s notion of citizenship involves individuals being accorded identical rights 
regardless of one’s race, gender, disability, age and so on.  This notion is rooted in 
liberalism portraying itself as “difference-blind”, in the sense that secondary features 
such as race, gender, disability, age and so on are irrelevant to a citizen’s standing in the 
public sphere. What matters the most is the primary feature that all citizens share, their 
core identity as citizens of a polity, where all citizens are treated in an identical fashion. 
Such an approach is to be governed by the principle of cultural neutrality, which means 
the state cannot favour the beliefs, practices and values of a particular culture or 
religion over another.  
However, in the context of a multicultural society, this notion of citizenship is 
problematic. Because a society’s norms reflect the preferences of the dominant majority 
group, identical or same treatment privileges those who subscribe to the majority 
norms. Consequently, minority groups are liable to feel marginalised because they 
cannot take full advantage of their formally equal status as citizens. As highlighted 
earlier, in a multicultural society, cultural neutrality is not viable in practice because the 
state cannot avoid endorsing one particular culture over another. Take language for 
example. The state has to deliver its education system in a common language and this 
common language will invariably reflect the language of the majority societal culture. 
As highlighted in Chapter 2, a societal culture is centred on a shared language and state 
institutions, and when the state decides which language is to be used in state practices 
and institutions, it is inevitably providing what Kymlicka identifies as the most 
important form of support needed by a societal culture (Kymlicka: 1995: 111).  As a 
result, cultural minorities will be worse off because their language needs are not being 
provided for, while the majority has its language needs met for free. This also links 
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back to Barry’s endorsement of “luck egalitarianism”. On Barry’s account, if 
individuals suffer adversely as a result of a freely made choice, then they should bear 
the consequences. If individuals suffer as a result of “brute luck”, then they should be 
compensated. In this context, if cultural minorities are worse off because their language 
does not match that of the dominant culture, it arguably constitutes a case of “brute 
luck”, given that being a member of a minority group is not voluntary. Therefore, on the 
basis of Barry’s framework, they should be compensated in the form of differential 
treatment. 
This would indicate that contemporary notions of citizenship must involve a 
“differential” approach to take into account the needs of particular cultural 
communities, and a “differential” approach inevitably involves the notion of differential 
treatment via group-differentiated rights. As highlighted in the previous chapter, in the 
relevant circumstances, differential treatment is a necessity if justice is to be served. 
Since cultural minorities are at a disadvantage in relation to the wider society, the 
principle of equality properly understood requires that cultural factors are taken into 
account to ensure minorities are put on an equal footing with the majority. However, for 
Barry, the idea of a differential approach that takes cultural factors into account is 
illogical due to his belief that culture is a product of individual choice. This will be 
explored further in the following sections. 
Culture: product of individual choice or product of cultural embeddedness  
The most significant area of disagreement between Barry and multiculturalists focuses 
on the question of whether culture is a product of individual choice or cultural 
embeddedness. Barry subscribes to the view that culture is a product of individual 
choice whereas multiculturalists such as Parekh believe individuals are culturally 
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constituted. While multicultural theorists such as Parekh refer to respect for diversity as 
the basis for exemptions from general rules, Barry emphasises our common human 
nature, and argues that it is not unreasonable to assume that there are certain universal 
needs that have to be met to live the good life, such as access to food and water (Barry: 
2001: 285). In other words, since we are all human beings, it is not absurd to assume 
that there is a single best way to live the good life.  
Multicultural theorists like Parekh, however, take the opposite view. As already 
highlighted, multicultural theorists such as Parekh believe that human beings are 
culturally embedded and that their behaviour and values are deeply shaped by their 
membership of a cultural community (Parekh: 2006: 120). Thus cultural membership is 
constitutive of an individual’s identity and does indeed matter as it is tied up with our 
inner emotions such as self-respect and identity (Parekh: 2006: 120, 350). Therefore, it 
is essential that culture is regarded as a primary good. Consequently, a commitment to 
equality may require treating individuals differently in cases where individuals would 
otherwise be disadvantaged on account of their cultural membership. In contrast, Barry 
believes that to treat everyone equally is to treat everyone identically. Exemptions can 
only be granted provided there are compelling enough reasons to grant the exemption 
and there are compelling enough reasons not to abolish the original law, conditions 
which he believes will be rarely satisfied.  
On the whole, Barry’s view of culture as a product of individual choice is not 
persuasive. While values and practices may well be open to critical reflection and 
revision, there is no “culture-free” perspective from which we “choose” our 
preferences. Since Barry views cultural commitments as akin to an expensive taste, he 
appears to believe that there is a neutral standpoint from which individuals can freely 
choose their cultural values and practices. This misrepresents the role and the 
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significance of culture. Instead, this thesis takes the Parekhian view that individuals are 
culturally constituted in the sense that their behaviour and values are deeply shaped and 
moulded by their membership of a cultural community.  Culture then is constitutive of 
an individual’s identity and serves as the basis on which minorities value their culture. 
It is on this basis that one’s culture should be accorded respect and recognition (Parekh: 
2006: 8). For minorities, recognition is important because it acknowledges the worth 
and legitimacy of their culture, which then contributes to the notion that their presence 
is valued and that they are accepted as equal members of society. By the same token, 
failure to accord respect and recognition denies the legitimacy of one’s identity. As 
Charles Taylor aptly puts it, “non-recognition or misrecognition can inflict harm, can be 
a form of oppression imprisoning someone in a false, distorted, and reduced mode of 
being” (Taylor: 1994: 25).  In this context, recognition is a vital “human need” (Taylor: 
1994: 26). Therefore, failure to recognise identity-related differences amounts to an 
injustice for minorities, and since we have come to accept that culture matters to 
individuals and that their self-esteem and worth is bound up in the recognition and 
respect by others (Parekh: 2006: 8), this should, if necessary, be reflected in political 
practice via the granting of group-differentiated rights. Moreover, recognition of many 
distinct cultural identities in a multicultural society partly reflects the disposition of 
Parekh’s framework. Since a genuine multicultural society inevitably draws attention to 
the differences between communities, recognition is vital because it gives minority 
communities the confidence to know that their input and views are going to be 






Does Barry really oppose exemptions? 
Barry’s failure to recognise the compelling nature of culture also renders the way in 
which he constructs his argument for the rule-and-exemption approach ineffective. 
Recall what Barry terms the rule-and-exemption approach: laws to which all citizens 
must adhere, with the exception of cultural minorities if it burdens them because of 
their beliefs or practices (Barry: 2001: 33). According to Barry, multicultural theorists 
believe such an approach should be more common, while egalitarian liberals like him 
believe exemptions should only be granted if the rationale behind the exemption is 
compelling enough to both override and retain the original law. Barry argues that these 
two criteria will rarely be met (Barry: 2001: 42). Barry’s position in this regard is 
contentious on two grounds: (a) where he concedes that exemptions are justified he 
arguably misrepresents the grounds for such exemptions; and (b) even on Barry’s 
criteria, exemptions can be justified more frequently than he acknowledges. 
While Barry concedes that in the case of the Sikh school boy an exemption is 
justified because the wearing of the turban does not affect the duty of the school to 
educate its pupils, equality properly understood implies that the exemption should be 
granted because of the Sikh school boy’s right to equality. Whereas Barry bases his 
reasoning in this case on consequentialist considerations, the exemption should be 
grounded on an appeal to the right to equality. As Parekh states, equality properly 
applied means that all children should be given an equal opportunity to attend the 
school of their choice, and if a school takes away that opportunity by imposing a dress 
code that bans the wearing of headgear, it imposes a burden that others are free from. 
Since this constitutes unequal treatment, an exemption is justified (Parekh: 2002: 148).  
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 Furthermore, despite Barry’s disdain for the politics of multicultural theorists, 
his own position is actually not too dissimilar to those he attacks, because the criteria he 
employs for his own positions suggest the rule-and-exemption approach is more 
justifiable than he acknowledges. According to Barry, an exemption is justified if (i) 
there is a good argument for having a certain rule (ii) there is a good reason for 
exempting some from a rule and (iii) the reason relates to some and not to all and hence 
the law should be retained  (Caney: 2002: 84). As Steve On (2006) notes regarding the 
case of the Sikh boy and the school uniform policy, Barry had argued that the wearing 
of a turban did not interfere with the effective functioning of the school nor did it pose a 
risk to the public. With children’s educational opportunities at stake, On believes that 
despite his avid displeasure for it, an exemption is essentially what Barry was arguing 
for (2006: 186).  
 Simon Caney also picks up this line of argument. On the subject of 
multicultural politics, Caney believes that Barry’s work in general “…is not so much 
‘an egalitarian critique of multiculturalism’ as an egalitarian statement of which 
measures put forward in the name of cultural justice are acceptable and which are not” 
(Caney: 2002: 84). Caney argues that even using Barry’s own criteria, cultural-based 
exemptions can be more readily justified than Barry acknowledges. The example he 
gives involves Muslim students being exempt from sitting examinations on days that 
clash with their religious holidays such as Eid. He states that because Eid falls on 
different dates each year, it would be reasonable to allow Muslim students to sit the 
examinations at a later date if the two were to clash, as is recommended by the 
Department for Education and Employment (Caney: 2002: 85-86). After all, if it is 
regarded as unfair to ask Christians to sit examinations on Christmas Day, it is also 
unfair to ask Muslims to sit examinations during Eid. Caney then suggests a scenario 
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where end of semester examinations are due to take place at the same time as Eid and 
he argues that it is reasonable for Muslim students to be exempt. Using the criteria for 
the rule-and-exemption approach, the examination meets condition (i) which is the rule, 
that students must attend examinations; Muslims have a reason for being exempt in that 
it leaves them unable to take part in a religious celebration hence meeting condition (ii); 
and the reason only applies to Muslims and not any others hence meeting condition 
(iii).  
Another example Caney gives is the case of Ahmad v. ILEA (1978) and Ahmad 
v.  UK (1981) where the employers of Mr Ahmad, a Muslim, refused to alter his 
teaching timetable so that he could attend Friday prayers (Caney: 2002: 86). Caney 
believes it is reasonable for the school to arrange his teaching timetable so he could 
attend Friday prayers. In addition, teachers in general have five free periods a week so it 
would not be too difficult to organise a timetable that would leave Fridays free for Mr 
Ahmad (Caney: 2002: 86). In contrast, Barry would probably argue that since the 
conventional school week is Monday to Friday, one wishing to enter the teaching 
profession must recognise that it involves teaching on all school days so for Mr Ahmad 
to think otherwise is wrong. However, applying the criteria for the rule-and-exemption 
approach would see the exemption being granted because the rule that teachers will 
teach Monday to Friday meets condition (i); to teach on a Friday imposes a burden on 
Muslims hence meeting condition (ii); and it only pertains to Muslims hence condition 
(iii). As, Caney’s examples demonstrate, based on Barry’s own criteria, exemptions are 






Barry argues that a universal conception of citizenship will suffice to accommodate the 
needs of cultural minorities and that any attempts to redefine this model of citizenship 
by granting group-differentiated cultural rights will undermine core liberal values. 
However, his arguments to support such a view are ultimately not persuasive and his 
overall approach to the issues of cultural diversity remains problematic. While Barry 
argues that a commitment to equality requires uniform treatment, in the context of a 
multicultural society, such an approach will inevitably disadvantage cultural minorities. 
Therefore, the idea of differential treatment, as advocated by multiculturalists, as a 
means of achieving equality for cultural minorities is required by justice.   
Not only does Barry miss the mark in relation to equal treatment, but he also 
misses the mark regarding the influence and, subsequently, the value of culture. For 
Barry, cultural beliefs and practices are products of individual choice, and he regards it 
as something more akin to an expensive taste. However this is misleading because of 
the significance of culture and the important role it can play in the lives of individuals. 
For some communities, their culture is not a product of individual choice, but more a 
duty to obey and follow the teachings of their religion. For some cultural communities, 
their culture is indicative and constitutive of their identity. The practices and beliefs of 
cultural communities form a major part of their way of life and cannot easily be 
relinquished without giving rise to some kind of structural disorientation or emotional 
loss. Furthermore, he also misses the mark in relation to the approach many 
multiculturalists adopt: the rule-and-exemption approach. Generally speaking, he 
believes such an approach is misguided because all laws will hinder some more than 
others and disputes any notion that suggests this hindrance amounts to an injustice for 
cultural communities. He accepts though that there will be the rare occasion where an 
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exemption can be justified if there is a compelling reason for it in the first place, and a 
compelling reason to retain the original law. However, as demonstrated in Caney’s 
critique, Barry’s criteria allow more room for exemptions than he acknowledges. For 
example, in the case of the Sikh school boy, while multiculturalists refer to respect for 
diversity and the right to equality as grounds for an exemption, Barry would refer to the 
consequentialist reason that the turban does not affect the school’s task of educating 
children. This shows that Barry’s egalitarian liberal position is more receptive to 
exemptions than he would like to acknowledge, and that his position is arguably closer 
to multiculturalists than he concedes.  
Nonetheless, given that Barry’s framework does not recognise or appreciate the 
significance of culture, a universal conception of citizenship is arguably not suited to 
meeting the demands of genuine cultural diversity. What is required is a framework that 
adopts a contextual approach to intercultural dialogue in cases of hard disagreement. 
Such a framework is better suited because it seeks to resolve disagreement on a case by 
case basis, whereas a universal approach does not. To this end, Part II seeks to explore 






Chapter 5. CRE reports and developing a framework of shared values and 
commitments 
Stability and social unity are arguably vital to the well-being of individuals in any 
society. They can be grounded in various factors including common traditions, practices 
and a shared national heritage. These may be more commonly associated with societies 
that are culturally and racially homogenous, such as, for example, Iceland or Japan. 
However, managing social unity and stability in the face of cultural diversity seems to 
be more demanding. In the case of Britain, diversity seems to be a prevailing issue. 
Historically speaking, as a multi-nation society, comprising the English, Scottish, 
Welsh and Northern Irish, the United Kingdom has always been diverse. These groups 
co-existing together bring its own problems, primarily pertaining to national sentiment. 
However, a new source of diversity in the UK, and indeed elsewhere, has now emerged: 
ethnic and religious minority groups. It is this source of diversity that seems to be more 
demanding. For example, as highlighted in Part I, cultural minorities are at risk of 
becoming marginalised in terms of social justice, employment and other areas on 
account of their group status. Theorists such as Kymlicka, Parekh and Barry have all 
proposed resolutions to these issues, but their frameworks remain problematic. 
It was argued in Part I that a contextual approach to dialogue between 
communities constitutes the most plausible response to the demands of cultural 
diversity. In line with Parekh’s conception of intercultural dialogue, Part I endorses a 
contextual approach that seeks to resolve hard cases through intercultural deliberation 
on a case by case basis. However, as noted in Chapter 3, Parekh’s own approach to 
intercultural dialogue remains too vague to provide concrete practical guidance and his 
conception of the overarching shared political framework too thin and abstract to 
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sustain a genuine sense of unity and stability. In light of these difficulties inherent in 
Parekh’s approach, this chapter will seek to develop the idea of intercultural dialogue 
within the context of debates regarding citizenship within contemporary Britain. 
This chapter uses sociological survey data to determine whether such a 
dialogical approach is viable. The data comes from the CRE, who in 2005 and 2006, 
produced Citizenship and Belonging: What is Britishness? and The Decline of 
Britishness: a Research Study, with the latter to be read in conjunction with the former. 
In general, the remit of the reports was to perform research on the ways in which British 
people of all ethnic backgrounds thought about the notion of Britishness and the role of 
Britishness in the integration process. The findings of these reports indicated a generic 
understanding of the notion of Britishness, but how the participants identified with the 
notion differed greatly across the board. 
 Sections (i) and (ii) will sketch some of the important findings of the two CRE 
reports, such as the recurring themes and elements of what constitutes Britishness and 
why the majority of participants believe the notion of Britishness is in decline. While 
section (ii) will identify some of the difficulties inherent in constructing an overarching 
British identity, section (iii) will argue that despite the declining notion of Britishness, 
there is cause for optimism because the findings of the data indicate that there are 
common values and attitudes shared between the majority and minority participants. 
The chapter will argue that these common values and attitudes are indicative of 
underlying factors that can help to bring the nation together. It will argue that such 
underlying factors can be developed and nurtured into an overarching national identity. 
How to develop this is the key question and this thesis will contend that the values and 
shared commitments that form the basis of a British national identity can be developed 
through intercultural dialogue. Subsequently, the values and commitments that are 
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derived from this dialogical process can serve as the backdrop to hard cases of 
disagreements.  
The chapter will lay out how this thesis envisages the process of intercultural 
dialogue by highlighting the aim and purpose of this research: to develop a greater 
understanding and awareness of diverse practices and beliefs; to foster and encourage 
equality; and to nurture a coherent and peaceful society, all of which need to be 
underlined by a commitment to conditions such as equal participation, respect, 
openness and tolerance. While these are values and commitments commonly associated 
with liberalism, the principles of fair dialogue and the weighing of contrary arguments 
do not constitute uniquely liberal values, but are principles that are widely recognised. 
Indeed politics inevitably involves disagreements (Waldron: 1999: 102-103) and almost 
all societies have found it necessary to establish institutions and procedures for 
adjudicating conflicts, which involve fair weighing and balancing of contrary 
arguments (Hampshire: 2002: 637). Although the conditions of intercultural dialogue 
may prove problematic for some citizens, this thesis will argue that given the 
unavoidable need to resolve disagreements, intercultural dialogue constitutes the most 
promising avenue in finding a common resolution.    
After highlighting the aim of dialogue and acknowledging its limitations, this 
thesis will explore how the process of dialogue may operate in practice. Dialogue in 
practice involves participation at grass-roots level, meaning it must begin with the 
ordinary citizen. It should begin with the ordinary citizen because collectively speaking 
they form the foundation of a political community. Therefore, if the values and 
commitments that form the make-up of an overarching British identity are derived from 
the citizenry itself, it commands legitimacy and authenticity. Moreover, the values and 
commitments that sustain the unity of society can serve as the backdrop to a contextual 
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approach to hard cases of disagreements. The chapter will conclude that this process of 
nurturing a shared overarching identity will lead to a thicker framework of values than 
Parekh’s politico institutional-based framework and stands a better change of sustaining 
unity within a genuine multicultural society.  
(i) The CRE reports – Citizenship and Belonging: What is Britishness? (2005) 
The Decline of Britishness: A Research Study (2006) 
The CRE commissioned ETHNOS Research and Consultancy1 to carry out research on 
the ways in which British people of all ethnic backgrounds thought about “Britishness”. 
This research resulted in two reports by the CRE, Citizenship and Belonging: What is 
Britishness? and The Decline of Britishness: A Research Study, with the latter to be 
read in conjunction with the former. Published in 2005, the aim of Citizenship and 
Belonging: What is Britishness? was to investigate the notion of “Britishness” and to 
bring society closer to answering the question “what is Britishness?” (CRE: 2005: 9-
10). It aimed to ascertain whether and how Britain’s multicultural society can truly be 
integrated, cohesive and successful, and what values and loyalties, if any, must be 
shared by communities and individuals all over Britain (CRE: 2005: 10). To do this, ten 
focus group discussions with participants representing various sections of the British 
population were asked to discuss the notion of “Britishness” via word associations and 
group discussions.  
The findings indicated there were eight themes that represented the make-up of 
“Britishness” (CRE: 2005: 19-31). These included: 
 
                                                          
1
 ETHNOS Research and Consultancy specialise in research with people from minority backgrounds. 




 the adoption of certain values and attitudes including the upholding of human 
rights, tolerance, fairness and respect for the rule of law; 
 the display of certain habits and behaviour such as queuing, politeness, engaging 
in certain sports and the consumption of certain foods such as curries, Yorkshire 
puddings and fish and chips; 
 speaking the English language; 
 national symbols such as the Union Jack flag, the Royal Family and Houses of 
Parliament.  
Historical factors: 
 the celebration of achievements in the past – historical, political, technological 
and sporting. 
British people: 
 three conceptions of who the British people are – English, Scottish and Welsh 
people; white English people; people of diverse ethnic origin. 
Legal identity: 
 the possession of a British passport officially recognises those as a British 
citizen. 
Geography: 
 the geography and landscape of the UK in general 
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(ii) Concerns - The Decline of Britishness: A Research Study 
Participants in the initial report, Citizenship and Belonging: What is Britishness?, were 
asked to discuss the elements that constituted “Britishness”. However, researchers 
found that instead of discussing “Britishness”, the majority of white participants 
spontaneously changed the topic slightly to talk about a perceived “decline” of 
Britishness (CRE: 2006: 4). Furthermore, ethnic minority participants, in particular 
British Muslims, also felt there was a decline in the notion of “Britishness”, but for 
different reasons. Hence, the CRE believed it was important to analyse this claim of 
“perceived decline” further and a second report, The decline of Britishness: A Research 
Study, was published in 2006.  
The picture painted by many white participants was of a general feeling of 
unhappiness. They felt the “Britishness” that they grew up with no longer exists due to 
the visibly increasing presence of people from different ethnic and religious 
backgrounds; that ethnic and religious minorities do not share many of the values, 
habits and behaviours associated with Britishness; that minorities receive preferential 
treatment over the “natives” in terms of welfare support; that they cannot express their 
discontent without being labelled racist; and that the values and lifestyle associated with 
Britishness no longer constitutes the “moral norm” (CRE: 2006: 9-13). The final point 
is a pertinent one in terms of the bigger picture because such a picture may indicate that 
intercultural dialogue, the very feature this thesis endorses, may prove to be 
challenging. If the white majority regard their way of life as the “moral norm”, it 
renders the concept of dialogue with minority groups moot, because the former would 
want the latter to change their ways in order to align themselves with the majority way 
of life. This implies a sense of arrogance in that it dismisses the cultures of minorities 
by assuming minorities have a duty to adapt their ways in order to fit in. It also runs 
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counter to Parekh’s belief that no one culture is morally superior to another, because it 
is not possible to show that this is the case using a common benchmark.  Instead, there 
are various conceptions of the “good life” that are just as legitimate as others and it is 
through dialogue and daily interaction that we can learn from each other.  
In terms of ethnic minority participants, in particular British Muslims, the 
picture painted was also one of general unhappiness. Their grievance is that even 
though they experience a close connection with Britishness, many felt the white British 
majority did not accept their presence in society and many felt that they were not 
accepted as legitimate British citizens. Many British Muslim participants felt that they 
were unfairly being asked to “choose between being British and being Muslim” by the 
white majority and they regarded this as absurd because the two are not mutually 
exclusive (CRE: 2006: 16). This stirs up resentment among Muslims who may regard a 
questioning of their loyalties as indicators of their religion and identity being looked 
down upon and viewed with suspicion by the majority society. Consequently, such 
feelings may lead Muslims to isolate and distance themselves from participation in the 
wider society. By isolating and distancing themselves, British Muslims are less likely to 
develop a strong sense of attachment to the wider national community and furthermore, 
it is a recipe for social instability in the sense that British Muslims may retreat behind 
the boundaries of their religious identity and focus on the interests of its adherents, 
giving rise to a “them” and “us” mentality. 
Can an overarching identity prevail? 
Based on these findings, the construction of an overarching identity grounded in 
Britishness would appear problematic. First of all, the data throughout showed that 
many English participants unconsciously switched between “Englishness” and 
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“Britishness”, indicating there was no was distinction between the two terms. 
Furthermore, participant statements also indicate that of the four home nations that 
make up the United Kingdom, England, and in particular white English people, were 
most strongly associated with “Britishness” (CRE: 2005: 22). This is problematic 
because “Britishness”, in the context of constructing a common framework to 
accommodate all citizens, cannot belong to the English alone. In other words, a 
distinction must be made between the two terms if Britishness is to incorporate not only 
cultural minorities, but also the four nations that constitute the UK. The aim of 
reworking Britishness is to make the notion more inclusive so that citizens from all 
backgrounds can identify with it. If “Englishness” and “Britishness” are to be thought 
of as the same, it runs the risk of excluding, for example, Scottish-based cultural 
minorities and white Scottish individuals.  
Secondly, it would appear that as things stand, the relationship between white 
participants and ethnic minorities, in particular British Muslims, has reached an 
impasse, with both majority and minority participants complaining that their identities 
are not given proper recognition. This makes the construction of an overarching identity 
based on “Britishness” more challenging. 
Thirdly, in order to address these problems, part of the CRE strategy was to 
rethink the national story and identity. In this context, it suggests that Britain needs to 
rethink its national story to counteract the assumption of past social harmony and its 
subsequent decline, and moreover, it suggests a need to reformulate the national identity 
in order to not only make diversity normal but to counter the assumption of white 
homogeneity (CRE: 2006: 30). This strategy embodies the aim of this thesis: it sets out 
to mould Britishness into an overarching concept that embodies diversity, seeks to 
create an identity that is inclusive of all, and aims to make diversity the norm.  
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 However, this thesis recognises the inherent difficulties in such a project 
because it involves challenging existing dominant conceptions of the national story. 
While most of the ethnic minority groups discussed the state of Britishness in 
contemporary terms, for example, focusing on issues such as racism and Islamophobia 
(CRE: 2006: 8), a large proportion of white participants discussed the state of 
Britishness in past terms, for example, focusing on an idealised and traditional 
conception of Britain. This “traditional” sense of Britishness can be associated with 
British success, where past achievements constituted a key role in Britishness. In the 
same context, the national story derives its nature from this success and it is this success 
that many white participants were proud of. In the survey data, it was found that 
historical and political achievements were seen as positive indicators of Britishness, but 
only among white participants, while ethnic minority participants did not see these 
achievements in the same positive light (CRE: 2005: 32). The following participant 
statements seem to back this up: 
Britain hasn’t done anything recently since the wars to relate to, to take hold of 
and be proud of. When I think of British things, I do tend to think of what went 
on years ago, when they fought for freedoms, when we were a great industrial 
nation, when we ruled the world. But we are no longer a great nation. (White 
Welsh, Cardiff) 
Question: What kinds of things do you associate with being British? 
Participant 1: “I think of colonies” 
Participant 2: “Colonialism” 
Participant 1: “Yeah, the British empire” 
Participant 2: “Exploitation! (Black Africans, Glasgow) 
(CRE: 2005: 31-32) 
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The statement from the white Welsh participant is indicative of how many white 
participants feel about their past achievements. Essentially it refers to the nostalgic view 
of Britain being a hugely influential and successful figure around the world, which they 
are proud of as it constitutes a large part of Britain’s national heritage. 
The Parekh Report  
Since the national story of Britain currently predominantly reflects the heritage of the 
white population, and is thus engrained in the mind-sets of the population and is 
reflected in daily life, the suggestion that it should be modified to incorporate cultural 
minorities is liable to draw an adverse reaction. This has already proven to be the case 
as another government initiated report, The Future of Multi-Ethnic Britain, better 
known as The Parekh Report, was widely criticised for suggesting the national story 
should be retold and also that the term “Britishness” possessed racial connotations. It 
stated that “Britishness as much as Englishness, has systematic largely unspoken, racial 
connotations” and this was due to its association with white supremacy, white privilege, 
imperialism and its historical position at the centre of British political and cultural life 
(2000a: 38).  
Consequently, The Parekh Report received widespread condemnation from the 
media. In terms of broadsheet coverage, the Daily Telegraph, as cited in Pilkington 
(2003), led the way in criticising the report with negative reporting including headlines 
such as “Straw wants to rewrite our history”. From a tabloid perspective, the Daily 
Mail, as cited in Pilkington (2003), drew up a related headline reporting that “British is 
racist”. In addition, some of the media coverage did not portray the true purpose of the 
recommendation and was rather inaccurate in its portrayal. For example, the Daily 
Telegraph substituted “racist” for “racial” in the quote suggesting the word British has 
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racist connotations which gave the impression that the report was insulting its 
readership (Pilkington: 2003: 272). The same paper also took things out of context 
regarding Britain’s history and its reinterpretation. It claimed that the report wanted to 
rework the history giving the impression that the latter were a group of despots wishing 
to rewrite history to suit their needs (Pilkington: 2003: 272).  
The Parekh Report also highlighted that the reluctance to change originates 
from a mentality that sees white Britain as a superior race, which stems from the 
achievements of the British Empire. This highlights not only the immense feeling of 
pride the majority place on their history and heritage, but also a reluctance to scrutinise 
the history and heritage to ascertain whether change is needed. Pilkington noted that 
change seemed to be a taboo notion for the majority of Brits as the bulk of the criticism 
of The Parekh Report stemmed from the fact that Britain needed to fundamentally alter 
its ways (Pilkington: 2003: 273). A real reluctance to change suggests that one sees 
nothing fundamentally wrong and this would substantiate the view that a substantial 
proportion of the white population holds a rigid and static conception of Britishness and 
that there is a lack of desire from the white population to incorporate minority groups 
into the make-up of Britishness. 
This thesis believes that the response to The Parekh Report epitomises the 
general sentiment of the white participants in the CRE survey data. In other words, the 
backlash to The Parekh Report for suggesting major change should fall predominantly 
on the majority in terms of reworking the national story resonates with the concerns of 





(iii) Room for optimism 
While these worries identify significant obstacles, this thesis believes there is an aspect 
of the CRE report that indicates some cause for optimism in the construction of an 
inclusive overarching identity. The report identified that all participants regardless of 
their background regarded values and attitudes such as tolerance, respect for the rule of 
law, fairness and speaking the English language as crucial elements of Britishness. This 
thesis believes these findings are indicative of the bigger picture, that is, British citizens 
do indeed share a range of underlying values and commitments that binds them together 
and defines them as British. How this is conceived is the key question. This thesis 
believes part of its conception can be cultivated through intercultural dialogue. By 
engaging in dialogue, the prospect of an overarching national identity capable of 
embodying all citizens can seem more realistic because, echoing Parekh’s claim, 
cultural diversity creates an environment where different communities can engage in 
mutually beneficial dialogue. In this context, engaging in dialogue can encourage us to 
debate and to determine the parameters of an overarching British identity. Moreover, an 
overarching British identity can provide a framework of values for the resolution of 
hard cases of disagreement. This echoes the Parekhian notion of “operative public 
values”, which constitutes the moral code of society and provides an acceptable starting 
point for dialogue. This thesis believes that the common values highlighted in the 
survey data could constitute the acceptable starting point for a contemporary conception 
of Britain’s “operative public values”. 
The following section will highlight how this thesis envisages the process of 
intercultural dialogue and the role it can play in developing a shared overarching 
identity. It begins by outlining how each individual has their own unique way of 
identifying and relating to a community, and why therefore an overarching identity 
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cannot be a fixed concept. The section will argue that in the face of diversity, 
intercultural dialogue constitutes the most promising avenue to arrive at a consensus 
regarding a shared overarching framework of values and commitments. Here, it will 
outline the conditions and principles governing dialogue, and what it may look like in 
practice. Finally, the CRE findings identified various elements that constitute the make-
up of Britishness. This thesis believes the dialogical process will reflect, and perhaps 
even go beyond, these findings because the CRE research effectively constitutes a 
platform for the ordinary citizen to express their beliefs regarding the conception of 
“Britishness”. In this context, the framework of values and commitments produced by 
the dialogical process will be suitably thicker than Parekh’s, whose notion for a shared 
national identity is based on shared political values. Such a framework can therefore 
serve as the backdrop to hard cases of disagreement between majority and minority 
communities.  
Constructing an overarching identity 
This thesis believes that a key approach in developing a national identity is via dialogue 
and discussion. This is because it recognises that, much like individual identity, 
identifying with and relating to a particular political community can be a complex and 
difficult process. It can be complex and difficult because not all individuals will identify 
with and relate to it in the same manner. As each individual is unique, they will identify 
and relate to it in their own unique way and some might be similar to others and some 
may widely differ from others. For example, one may derive their sense of national 
identity from the political institutions of society such as the Houses of Parliament and 
the Royal Family, both of which incidentally were identified as core themes of 
Britishness in the CRE survey data. Some may derive their national identity via ethno-
cultural characteristics, such as supporting their national football or rugby team. 
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Incidentally, the CRE report identified that engaging in sport was a British thing to do 
and that when it comes to major sporting tournaments, the notion of a British identity is 
even more in the mind-set of people (CRE: 2005: 29). Ethno-cultural characteristics 
such as these are not enough to hold society together, as Parekh identifies, but the fact 
that they featured highly in the data disputes the Parekhian claim that a national identity 
should be based purely on the political values of society, such as the justice system, 
democracy and modes of public discourse that all citizens can be expected to share as 
members of a political community. To fully establish what binds the people of Britain 
together, this thesis believes the process of intercultural dialogue can generate a deeper 
and more comprehensive conception of the core values and commitments that define a 
British identity. 
 Aim of dialogue 
Before considering what the process of dialogue may look like, it would be prudent to 
outline the main aims of intercultural dialogue and the necessary conditions regulating 
the process. This thesis believes the aim of intercultural dialogue is to open up and 
engage in discussions between individuals, communities and organisations with 
different cultural perspectives. Engaging in such dialogue can promote a greater 
understanding and awareness of diverse practices and beliefs. As the term 
“intercultural” implies, it fosters equal and open participation between various groups. 
In addition, intercultural dialogue can promote equality and respect in the sense that it 
promotes equal worth among citizens. The dialogical process affords citizens the 
opportunity to express their views, with the principle that the view of one citizen is just 
as important as the next. A society that nurtures equal and open participation in the 
dialogical process is a society that can give rise to greater equality and respect for their 
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fellow citizen. It encourages participants to listen to others and to take on board new 
perspectives in life. Moreover, participants in the dialogical process must recognise 
that, especially in hard cases of disagreements, they are not there simply to convey their 
point of view in the hope that the other party will change its mind. The point of 
dialogue is to engage and move forward on a particular matter, and this may mean 
having to engage in adaptation and revision. When coming to the table, participants 
must be aware that no particular viewpoint is superior and they must articulate their 
position if they wish to advance their viewpoints. In this context, genuine dialogue must 
not involve presumptions on either side. That is to say, participants must be willing to 
work together in the hope of achieving a positive outcome and to nurture a better 
society.  
While equal participation, respect, openness and tolerance are vital if 
intercultural dialogue is to be successful, it could be argued that these conditions are 
very demanding. Not all participants in the dialogical process will be reciprocal and 
open-minded to the views of others. Some participants may simply wish to state their 
viewpoint in the hope that the other side will change their mind, or they may believe 
that their viewpoints are superior to others and no amount of dialogue will change that. 
In this context, a shift in the mind-set is required if the conditions of dialogue outlined 
previously are to be satisfied.  
A positive process of intercultural dialogue requires that participants possess a 
certain mind-set and attitude that is characterised by respect, openness and tolerance of 
others from a different cultural perspective from one’s own. This thesis believes a 
strong multicultural education system can promote such a mind-set. A strong 
multicultural education system is not only important for instilling the proper mind-set 
for dialogue, but also for social unity as a whole because it is important that citizens 
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feel at ease with one another despite their various differences. Echoing a view of 
Parekh, a strong multicultural syllabus can cultivate a climate where individuals are 
open and receptive to other cultures and ways of life, and can provide individuals with 
the knowledge and awareness required to be tolerant of practices and beliefs that are 
substantially different from one’s own (Parekh: 2006: 14-15). In addition, a strong 
multicultural syllabus should foster an awareness of the inevitability of disagreements 
in genuinely multicultural societies, and to recognise that fair and equal dialogue 
constitutes the best vehicle for resolving these disagreements. Over time as the 
multicultural syllabus is implemented, it can arm a generation of citizens with the 
necessary knowledge and mind-set required to co-exist peacefully with their diverse 
neighbours.  With this knowledge and mind-set, individuals are more likely to subscribe 
and adhere to the conditions of intercultural dialogue, and therefore are more likely to 
achieve a positive outcome. 
 Conditions of dialogue  
While the emphasis on equal participation, respect, openness and tolerance undoubtedly 
are values and commitments commonly associated with liberalism, this is not to say that 
this thesis seeks to endorse a liberal conception of the good life. The principles of fair 
dialogue and the weighing of contrary arguments do not constitute uniquely liberal 
values, but are principles which are widely recognised. Indeed politics inevitably 
involves disagreements (Waldron: 1999: 102-103) and almost all societies have found it 
necessary to set up institutions and procedures for adjudicating conflicts, which involve 
fair weighing and balancing of contrary arguments (Hampshire: 2002). Thus while 
Kymlicka’s position rests on a substantive commitment to fundamental liberal values, 
which give rise to typically liberal outcomes, the framework for intercultural dialogue 
advocated in this thesis is purely procedural. In other words, it endorses principles that 
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are conducive to fair dialogue. As such, it does not rule out that the participants in 
intercultural dialogue will find ways of accommodating non-liberal ways of life, 
provided these can be reconciled with a shared conception of Britain’s “operative public 
values”.  
A multicultural society will contain a wide spectrum of groups including liberal, 
non-liberal, part-liberal, conservative and religious minorities. Therefore, a suitable 
framework must take into account the complexity of managing a society with a wide 
spectrum of beliefs and practices. In this regard, the thesis endorses the Parekhian view 
that the politics of multiculturalism is about managing the relationship and establishing 
fair terms of justice between different communities. If this goal is to be achieved, 
dialogue must take place in a climate of tolerance and respect of other cultures and must 
encourage greater equality. 
That is not to deny that the conditions of intercultural dialogue may prove 
burdensome for some citizens. Indeed these conditions may well be more burdensome 
for some than for others. However, this does not mean that they are fundamentally 
unfair. For example, a community whose group norms involve women being accorded a 
lower status than men may refrain from participating in an intercultural dialogue 
because the conditions underlying such dialogue endorses gender equality in the form 
of equal participation. They would obviously prefer to engage in dialogue under 
conditions that only allow men to participate. However, given the unavoidable need to 
resolve disagreements, widely recognised principles such as equal participation, respect, 
openness and tolerance are arguably vital if citizens are to find common ground. 
Therefore, a process of intercultural dialogue that is underpinned by such principles 
constitutes the most promising avenue to resolve hard cases of disagreement. 
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If minority groups still refuse to participate, perhaps the best that can be hoped 
for is to leave the door open to dialogue and negotiation. In other words, certain 
minority groups can choose not to participate if they feel it is for the best. The key idea 
of dialogue is that no viewpoint is assumed to be automatically superior and this can 
only be achieved if parties in the dialogical process see each other as equal participants 
and are willing to work together to nurture a better society. While the way of life of 
communities who refuse to participate in intercultural dialogue should be tolerated, and 
such communities should be able to pursue their way of life in the non-political private 
realm within the confines of the law of the land, such communities cannot expect public 
support or recognition. Should they wish to come back and engage in the dialogical 
process, they are free to do so as long as they participate in good faith and respect and 
uphold the principles governing dialogue.  
 Process of dialogue 
This thesis believes the process of dialogue must begin from the bottom-up. That is to 
say, dialogue must begin with the “average citizen” because, essentially, it is the 
“average citizen” who forms the bedrock of a united political community. Social unity 
cannot be fashioned from the top. In other words, the state cannot say that the 
framework of shared values that holds this particular society together are X, Y and Z. 
Values X, Y and Z must be derived organically: they must come from the citizenry 
itself. If values come from the citizenry itself, they will command more legitimacy and 
are more likely to foster a common belonging between citizens. Hence, intercultural 
dialogue can yield a more authentic conception of “Britishness” because it gives 
ordinary citizens the opportunity to collectively determine what binds them together. 
Moreover, it also gives the ordinary citizen the opportunity to develop and nurture their 
existing views of Britishness. Some ordinary citizens may possess abstract thoughts, 
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may be undecided or may not be able to articulate clearly what they regard as key 
elements of a British identity. Extensive discussions and the exchange of ideas can be 
used to nurture and develop the ability of ordinary citizens to articulate and convey the 
values and commitments that ordinary British citizens share. This is important because 
British citizens will believe that as citizens, they share characteristics and features with 
other citizens. Dialogue will give greater clarity to what these features and 
characteristics are.  
To give an example of how intercultural dialogue may look in practice, a series 
of informal public meetings or functions may take place, where participants ranging 
from the “average citizen”; to minority community leaders; to advisory bodies; to 
government think-tanks; to academics, are invited to the city or town’s municipal 
building to participate in discussions regarding what constitutes British values and what 
it means to be British and how to unite society and so on. Such an environment offers 
participants the opportunity to voice their opinion and to develop their understanding of 
how others derive their sense of national identity. In this sense, the values of Britishness 
are derived organically because they come from the citizenry itself. At a national level, 
central government can initiate the process by developing a statement of intent which 
can provide an initial focal point for such debates. In this context, the values highlighted 
in the CRE survey data such as tolerance, fair play, respect for the rule of law and 
upholding human rights can constitute a starting point for the development of a 
contemporary conception of Britain’s “operative public values”. 
Although the CRE survey data essentially constitutes a one-off snapshot of what 
a small number of participants regard as the hallmarks of a British identity, it is 
arguably not unreasonable to assume that a nation-wide dialogical process would yield 
a framework that is broadly similar to the findings of the CRE. Assuming dialogue will 
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reflect findings similar to the CRE survey data, a clear and consistent framework of 
values would begin to emerge. For example, in the CRE survey, values such as the 
upholding of human rights, tolerance, fairness and respect were explicitly identified as 
constituting elements of a British identity by all participants. Fairness and respect were 
also implicitly identified in the form of an ethno-cultural trait: queuing (CRE: 2005: 
29). In other words, being reserved and queuing can be seen as symbolic of Britishness. 
Even the act of being reserved is said to be indicative of respect and tolerance because it 
implies politeness and an unwillingness to cause offence. This would indicate a 
consistency in terms of the values and attitudes that British people share. Such values 
and attitudes could provide the foundation for a conception of society’s “operative 
public values”, which can be revised accordingly when dialogue is initiated to establish 
the elements of a British national identity. While Parekh’s conception of a national 
identity is grounded in the political values of society, the elements identified in the CRE 
survey appear to go beyond that. In this context, the dialogical approach of this thesis is 
thicker than the Parekhian framework as it offers substantially more room to cultivate a 
sense of belonging. Consequently, a thicker framework can serve as the backdrop to 
hard cases of disagreement between majority and minority communities.  
Hard cases of disagreement 
The thicker framework of shared values all citizens can subscribe to, then, can 
constitute an appropriate backdrop in hard cases of disagreements. This is particularly 
important when adopting a contextual approach to dialogue in hard cases of 
disagreements. A contextual approach to dialogue is one that emphasises working on a 
case-by-case basis. In the context of this thesis, it involves examining the specific 
nature of the practice itself and the specific nature of the disagreement itself. Take, for 
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example, the issue of reworking the national story.  Suppose that the dialogical process 
has resulted in a shared framework of British values that consists of X, Y and Z. The 
national story has been a contentious issue for many, for the debate centres on the fact 
that the existing story predominantly reflects the heritage of the white Christian 
population of society and should be changed to incorporate minority communities. 
Imagine, for example, that a particular group of citizens believes the national story to be 
adequate and sufficient and not in need of revision. Given that X, Y and Z constitute the 
contents and values associated with an inclusive and comprehensive British identity, the 
question that should be asked is whether the rationale for non-revision of the national 
story is consistent with X, Y and Z. Assuming the dialogical process that led to X, Y 
and Z incorporates citizens from all backgrounds, the values will be adequately 
inclusive. In other words, the values will be indicative of a culturally diverse society. 
Through dialogue a particular group of citizens who genuinely believe that the existing 
national story should not be revised to incorporate minority communities, can be shown 
that their position is inconsistent with values X, Y and Z. For example, in the dialogical 
process, it could be conveyed that with cultural diversity seeming to be a permanent 
trait, and considering the role minorities played in helping to restore Britain’s economic 
health in the aftermath of the WW2, it is only natural that they be incorporated into the 
national story. Furthermore, Britain’s “operative public values” partly include, for 
example, respect, tolerance and openness, and this would clash with a position that does 
not want to include minority communities in the national story. In the name of 
democratic justice, those objecting to the changes in the national story should be given 
the chance to articulate their rationale behind it. However, with the aim of dialogue to 
create a cohesive multicultural enterprise that is inclusive of all, the rationale should 
easily be refuted.  
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Moreover, the acceptance of the rationale to revise the story will indicate that 
the guiding values and principles that initially led to their decision not to revise the 
story was intuitively incorrect and therefore highlights the fact that a contextual 
approach to hard cases of disagreement is necessary if it can lead to adaptation and 
change. In other words, people’s intuitions are not always correct. For example, it is not 
unreasonable to say the idea of universal citizenship, as endorsed by Barry, is 
intuitively the ideal form of citizenship because discrimination on the grounds of race, 
gender, social class and so on is to be avoided by treating everyone equally. Differences 
based on these elements are regarded as “private” matters and are irrelevant to the 
public status that one holds as an equal citizen. However, analysed further, one who 
endorses the virtues of universal citizenship may realise, through dialogue, that it 
burdens certain minority communities, such as, for example, the Sikh community in 
relation to the compulsory wearing of the turban and a school enforcing a uniform 
policy that includes a head cap. Intuitively, there is nothing insensitive about enforcing 
a school uniform policy that requires all boys to wear a particular garment of uniform, 
and it would seem unfair if one boy is exempt from this policy. However, once the 
situation is examined further, one can see that a Sikh boy would be significantly 
disadvantaged if the policy is applied to him. Therefore, the Sikh boy would have to be 
exempt from wearing a head cap in order to be treated equally. In this context, it is 
necessary to treat some people differently from the rest in order to treat them equally. 
The point is that people’s intuitions are not always correct, and a dialogical approach 






The findings of the CRE survey highlight a number of difficulties inherent in any 
attempt to create a strong overarching identity that is sufficiently flexible to 
accommodate diversity. These include the negative perception of ethnic and religious 
minorities among white participants. The latter believe the former do not share, and in 
some cases undermine, the values and characteristics associated with Britishness. It is 
for this reason that they attribute blame to ethnic minorities for the perceived decline in 
Britishness. This suggests a major difficulty in reworking Britishness and creating an 
overarching national identity that is inclusive of all. Moreover, the rebranding of 
Britishness in terms of its national history and heritage so that it incorporates ethnic and 
religious groups appears to be a sensitive issue for many white participants. For 
example, the recommendation by The Parekh Report to rework the national history and 
heritage caused considerable controversy and anger, much of which focused on the 
suggestion that Britain should alter its ways. This can be seen as indicative of a real 
reluctance to change. This reluctance to change seems to come from an entrenched 
sense of pride in past events such as the success of the British Empire and its implicit 
association with white supremacy, which has now seeped into everyday life. This 
makes change difficult and the chance of rebranding Britishness in a way that is 
inclusive of ethnic and religious communities more problematic.  
Nevertheless, the CRE data highlights a genuine consensus regarding key values 
and commitments that define “Britishness”. This is indicative of the bigger picture, 
namely British citizens do indeed share overarching values and commitments that bind 
them as British citizens. Interestingly, many of the common features identified by 
respondents extend beyond the purely political-institutional framework for a shared 
national identity advocated by Parekh. This chapter has argued that to clearly articulate 
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these requires a process of intercultural dialogue that is purely procedural. The contents 
that emerge from this dialogical process would be a clear and inclusive conception of 
the values and commitments that constitute a British identity, which could serve as the 
backdrop to a contextual approach to hard cases of disagreements. 
How the process of intercultural dialogue is conceived is central to developing a 
thicker conception of a British identity. First, participants must embrace the spirit of 
dialogue. Thus participants must be respectful of other parties in the dialogical process, 
must recognise that they are there to develop and nurture a cohesive and peaceful 
multicultural enterprise, and that part of this process may involve mutual adaptation and 
revision. To nurture this process, a strong multicultural education system that fosters a 
climate of openness, tolerance and awareness of other practices and beliefs is important, 
especially for future generations. In addition, a strong multicultural education should 
prepare its students for the inevitability of disagreements that envelop multicultural 
societies. That way, they are more likely to recognise that they have to work with others 
to achieve a positive consensus and to work together means to engage in a process of 
dialogue that is characterised by equal participation, respect, openness and tolerance.  
While the emphasis on equal participation, respect, openness and tolerance are 
undoubtedly values and commitments commonly associated with liberalism, this is not 
to say that this thesis seeks to endorse a liberal conception of the good life. The 
principles of fair dialogue do not constitute uniquely liberal values, but are principles 
which are widely recognised. The nature of politics means disagreement is inevitable 
and this means there inevitably is a need for institutions and procedures to adjudicate 
these disagreements. Given this need, a framework of dialogue based on principles such 
as fairness, openness and respect constitutes the most appropriate vehicle for finding a 
common resolution. These principles are arguably widely recognised and can be 
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endorsed by all groups regardless of the doctrine they subscribe to. Therefore, it does 
not rule out, in principle, the accommodation of non-liberal minorities, provided their 
practices can be reconciled with a shared conception of Britain’s operative public 
values.  
 The dialogue must begin with the ordinary citizen because as a collective 
citizenry, they form the bedrock of the political community. Such dialogue can provide 
a basis for citizens to develop a coherent framework of overarching values that all 
citizens can endorse. For example, CRE survey data indicated that upholding human 
rights, respect, fairness and tolerance were values that were shared by all participants, 
and that certain habits and behaviours, such as queuing, were regarded as 
quintessentially British because they embody values such as respect and fairness. By 
helping to articulate shared values, dialogue can help to nurture an overarching British 
identity, which can provide an appropriate frame of reference in hard cases of 
disagreements.  As the CRE data suggests, such dialogue is liable to give rise to a 
significantly thicker framework than Parekh’s purely political-institutional conception 





Chapter 6. Conclusion 
Throughout the course of Part I, this thesis has explored the notion of citizenship within 
the context of cultural diversity. Prior to the contemporary debates regarding the status 
of minority groups, it had been established that the concept of citizenship is linked to a 
set of rights associated with membership in a political community. According to T.H. 
Marshall’s conception of citizenship, this set of rights consists of civil, political and 
social rights. Ultimately, the latter of the three was established to facilitate the first two. 
As the working class were socially excluded from the dominant culture due to the 
adverse impact of capitalism, the development of social rights enabled those excluded 
to exercise their claim to civil and political rights. It was therefore established that 
Marshall conceived of social rights as the “third leg” in the “three legged stool” of 
citizenship.  
However, in the context of contemporary citizenship in a multicultural society, 
Marshall’s analysis of citizenship is not enough. Contemporary debates regarding 
citizenship now centre on the claims of cultural minorities, who are disadvantaged by 
virtue of their membership in a distinct minority culture. How to remedy this 
disadvantage and secure equal citizenship for minorities has been the subject of 
contentious debate. One remedy includes expanding the “three-legged stool” of 
citizenship into a “four-legged chair”, with group-differentiated rights constituting the 
fourth leg. Will Kymlicka’s conception of multicultural citizenship constitutes one of 
the most influential attempts to expand the notion of citizenship in this fashion. Given 
that liberals emphasise the importance of the primacy of the individual, Kymlicka’s 
work attempts to reconcile the liberal tradition with group-differentiated rights. His core 
thesis lies in the belief that group-differentiated rights can be justified because they 
foster individual autonomy and equality, and his entire argument is predicated on this 
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assumption. However, in the context of this thesis, Kymlicka’s framework was found 
lacking because he fails to appreciate cultural diversity in its own terms. In other words, 
there is no appeal to the value of culture and cultural diversity as a whole. Furthermore, 
Kymlicka’s undue emphasis on the promotion of individual autonomy is problematic in 
the face of genuine cultural diversity because not all cultural groups subscribe to 
autonomy in the same manner as liberals do. Consequently there is a risk that justice is 
to be denied to minority groups who do not attach the same primacy to autonomy as 
liberals. A genuinely multicultural society will contain an eclectic mix of cultural 
communities including liberal, part-liberal and non-liberal communities, and 
Kymlicka’s overtly liberal framework does not give due consideration to the latter two. 
A genuinely multicultural society requires a framework in which communities 
know their presence is valued and accepted and Parekh’s framework helps to express 
this. Parekh’s approach essentially involves emphasising the worth of cultures and 
cultural diversity as a whole. For Parekh, cultures are valuable regardless of whether 
they are realistic options for us. He believes that a culture has value not only for its own 
members, but also for members of other cultural communities. His belief is that other 
cultures help us to remain grounded and provides a standpoint from which individuals 
can identify the strengths and weaknesses of their own culture. Thus, the presence of 
diverse cultural communities expands our intellectual horizons and encourages us to 
explore beyond our own culture. Moreover, individuals are culturally constituted in the 
sense that culture shapes and plays a significant role in the development of one’s 
individual identity and shapes one’s conception of the good life. By recognising and 
appreciating the role cultures play and the profound impact they can have on 
individuals, we can begin to see that the politics of multiculturalism is ultimately about 
managing the relationship between different cultural communities via intercultural 
117 
 
dialogue. However, despite his insights into the value of cultural diversity, Parekh’s 
framework remains problematic because his concept of intercultural dialogue is vague 
and the political structure he advocates remains rooted within liberalism. While Parekh 
claims his framework transcends liberal principles, in practice it reflects a liberal 
outlook. This is problematic given his overall position is underpinned by a commitment 
to value pluralism: the belief that there is no single conception of the “good life” but 
rather a variety of competing and equally legitimate conceptions. He argues throughout 
that liberalism should be seen as one conception of the good life among many others, 
and that the principles of justice governing a multicultural society cannot involve liberal 
principles alone. However, the framework that Parekh proffers seems to remain rooted 
in liberal values, which is evident in his grounding for a shared political identity and the 
values sustaining intercultural dialogue.  
While the notion of group-differentiated rights for minorities has attracted 
considerable critical attention, even the most vociferous critic of multiculturalism 
cannot convey a suitable framework that secures equal citizenship for minorities. Barry 
emphasises the notion of universal citizenship throughout his critique of multicultural 
policies but ultimately misses the point because he fails to understand the significance 
of culture to its adherents. Moreover, despite arguing against the notion of group-
differentiated rights such as legal exemptions and claiming cultures are a product of 
individual choice, his position regarding the claims of minorities is arguably closer to 
the multiculturalist position than he suggests. For example, Barry opposes exemptions 
in general but like the multiculturalist approach believes they should be granted when 
there is a compelling case for it. However, while multiculturalists ground their case for 
exemptions in an appeal to the value of culture and equality properly understood, Barry 
bases his argument on consequentialist considerations. In the case of the Sikh school 
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boy, Barry believes an exemption is justified because the wearing of the turban does not 
interfere in the school’s ability to educate its pupils whereas the multiculturalist position 
is that the exemption is justified on grounds that it is consistent with the right to 
equality.   
 Drawing on Parekh’s emphasis on the value of cultural diversity and his view 
that the politics of multiculturalism is essentially about managing the relationship 
between different cultural communities, this thesis has argued for a contextual approach 
to intercultural dialogue as the most plausible response to hard cases of disagreements 
between minorities and majorities. Such intercultural dialogue can provide the 
foundation for developing an overarching British national identity.  
 In this context the thesis endorses Parekh’s notion that individuals are culturally 
constituted. A secure culture in which one grows up helps to shape one’s beliefs and 
convictions and generally gives a sense of guidance to one’s life. As a result, the 
absence of a secure culture can be detrimental and group-differentiated rights should be 
accorded to alleviate the burdens minorities may face. However, whether specific 
group-differentiated rights should be accorded is dependent on the circumstances, 
particularly in hard cases of contention, and therefore a contextual approach to dialogue 
is required. That is to say contentious issues should be decided on a case-by-case basis. 
This is because the guiding values and principles that initially determine the outcomes 
of hard cases may be intuitively wrong, especially if, in practice, it results in injustice 
and hardship for minorities. For example, at first glance, the concept of uniform 
treatment, where all individuals are treated equally regardless of race, gender, social 
class and so on may be regarded as the most appropriate form of citizenship. Therefore, 
our values and principles that are used to determine and deliberate hard cases of 
disagreements are influenced by our intuition that all individuals should be treated the 
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same. However, cultural diversity throws up many demanding circumstances that may 
well go against the values and principles of uniform treatment. For example, a school 
enforcing a uniform policy for its male pupils which includes a head cap does not seem 
unreasonable, but for a Sikh male it is highly problematic as the wearing of the turban 
conflicts with the wearing of the head cap. The Sikh child’s family wishes that he 
attends that particular school but the school decides not to admit him on the grounds he 
cannot comply with the school uniform policy. A contextual approach to dialogue with 
the school would show that their decision is wrong. For example, it would be conveyed 
to the school that all individuals have the equal opportunity to attend their preferred 
school, and since the chosen school effectively bans the wearing of turbans by 
enforcing a uniform policy that includes the compulsory wearing of head caps, it 
imposes a restriction on the Sikh child that others are free from. Exempting the Sikh 
child would free him from this restriction and he would be treated equally along with 
the other children. Accepting this premise will mean that those running the school will 
have developed a new perspective and understanding in terms of how to uphold the 
principle of equality. 
The point is that a contextual approach to dialogue generates different outlooks 
and ideas which would allow for re-evaluation of these guiding principles and values. 
Such intercultural dialogue can be beneficial for all parties and help to nurture an 
overarching common framework of values and principles. To this end, developing the 
process of intercultural dialogue is important, not only for the resolution of contentious 
issues, but also for developing an overarching British identity. From the outset, 
participants should recognise that the aim of dialogue is to foster greater awareness and 
understanding of diverse practices and beliefs, and to move forward in relation to hard 
cases of disagreement. Since genuine multicultural societies tend to throw up alternative 
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points of view, it is indicative of the nature of politics – the inevitability of 
disagreements. In this context, there is a need for a set of rules and procedures to 
manage this and the framework for intercultural dialogue proffered in this thesis is 
purely procedural. In the face of cultural diversity, this thesis believes that to be 
effective, intercultural dialogue must be underpinned by a commitment to principles 
that are widely recognised, such as equal participation, openness, respect and tolerance. 
While Kymlicka’s framework is typically liberal and gives rise to liberal outcomes, the 
framework of this thesis is purely procedural and does not rule out that participants in 
the dialogical process will find ways of accommodating non-liberal ways of life. 
Moreover, dialogue should begin with the ordinary citizen because collectively, 
they form the core values and commitments that bind together a stable society. The 
values and commitments that bind society together cannot be fashioned from the top. 
Instead, they should be derived by the people, and for the people. In other words, the 
values and commitments that bind society together will command more legitimacy and 
integrity if they come from the citizenry itself. What emerges is a clear framework of 
values and commitments that all citizens can endorse. The sociological data considered 
in chapter 5 suggests that in a British context, such a shared framework is liable to be 
significantly thicker framework than Parekh’s framework for an overarching national 
identity, which is conceived primarily in terms of the political values of society.  
From a British perspective, intercultural dialogue can give rise to a common set 
of values and commitments that underline a British overarching identity. It gives 
citizens a platform to express what they believe constitutes the values and commitments 
that make up a British identity. By ascertaining what these are, they can be nurtured and 
developed into an overarching British identity, one that is sufficiently strong to sustain 
unity and flexible enough to accommodate diversity. Recent sociological data compiled 
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by the CRE shows that the prospect of developing an inclusive overarching British 
identity is challenging given that there are several issues that need to be addressed, 
including the reworking of the national story and the declining relationship between 
white participants and ethnic minorities. However, given that the CRE data indicated 
the constant presence of common values and commitments by all participants, it would 
appear that the people of Britain do indeed share some sort of commonality. To 
establish and nurture this will involve a sustained process of intercultural dialogue, 
which this thesis believes can give rise to a common set of values and commitments 
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